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Reading Ricci and Pyett to Provide Racial Justice Through 
Union Arbitration 
MICHAEL Z. GREEN* 
I have asserted a firm conviction . . . that working together we can 
move beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact we have 
no choice if we are to continue on the path of a more perfect union. For 
the African-American community, that path . . . also means binding our 
particular grievances . . . to the larger aspirations of all Americans—
the white woman struggling to break the glass ceiling, the white man 
whose been laid off, the immigrant trying to feed his family . . . . In the 
white community, the path to a more perfect union means 
acknowledging that what ails the African-American community does 
not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of 
discrimination—and current incidents of discrimination, while less 
overt than in the past—are real and must be addressed.1  
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Development, Texas 
Wesleyan University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt 
for inviting me to participate in the Symposium Labor and Employment Law Under the 
Obama Administration: A Time for Hope and Change? as part of a specific panel to discuss 
“Employment Law: Antidiscrimination Law under a Black President in a ‘Post-Racial’ 
America?” held at Indiana University Maurer School of Law on November 12–13, 2010. 
The comments from the participants in that Symposium and those offered by assigned 
readers Deborah Widiss and Kevin Brown provided a rich perspective for me to explore the 
issues herein. Also, I am very grateful to have received very insightful suggestions from 
Sarah Rudolph Cole and Ann Hodges that helped me immensely in improving key 
components of this Article. I also benefitted by receiving many helpful comments from 
workshop participants when I raised this issue previously at the following programs: Fourth 
Annual AALS Dispute Resolution Section Works-in-Progress in October 2010; Third 
National People of Color Scholarship Conference in September 2010; Law and Society 
Annual Meeting in May 2010; Third Annual AALS Dispute Resolution Section Works-in-
Progress Conference held in November 2009; SEALS Annual Meeting in August 2009; 
ABA Annual Meeting Dispute Resolution Section Program in August 2009; AALS 
Midwinter Work Law Meeting in July 2009; and the Second Annual Labor and Employment 
Scholars Colloquium in 2007, where I first proposed the idea of exploring better 
opportunities for unions to provide racial justice through arbitration of statutory 
discrimination claims. I appreciate the financial support provided by the Texas Wesleyan 
University School of Law and the student research assistance from Rachel Hale, Amy 
Herrera, Keena Hilliard, Jillian Munoz, Robyn Murrell, Stephanie Rodriguez, Anne Sontag, 
and Kristen vanBolden. I dedicate this Article in memory of my champion, Margaret Green, 
and in honor of what she believed would never happen in her lifetime but she did live to 
see—the first black U.S. president. 
 1. Senator Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008) (transcript available 
at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/hisownwords). 
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INTRODUCTION: RESOLUTION OF WORKPLACE RACISM THROUGH UNION 
ARBITRATION AS INTEREST-CONVERGENCE 
The above-quoted words from President Barack Obama about creating “a more 
perfect union” can have two meanings.2 First, these words suggest the power of a 
more perfect union in our society to address the racial problems that exist. But 
these words can also suggest what labor unions can do to pursue racial harmony in 
the workplace on behalf of their members.3 The concept of joining forces with 
others—and consolidating concerns of racism with broader societal concerns—that 
President Obama so eloquently captures above appears to resemble the interest-
convergence theory Professor Derrick Bell espoused many years ago.4  
Under this theory, issues concerning race in our society cannot be addressed 
adequately unless the interests of the subordinated racial group converge with the 
interests of the majority.5 Specifically, Professor Bell argues in his interest-
convergence thesis6 that regardless of the level of “racial hostility and 
discrimination” blacks face in our society, no “meaningful relief” has ever occurred 
“until policymakers perceived that the relief blacks sought furthered interests or 
resolved issues of more primary concern.”7 In applying this interest-convergence 
theory to employment discrimination concerns8 of African American workers under 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. Other authors have suggested coalitions involving organized labor. See, e.g., 
LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 75–82, 101–03 (2002) (describing problems while 
advocating broad-based coalitions between white and black workers); Leroy D. Clark, 
Movements in Crisis: Employee-Owned Businesses—A Strategy for Coalition Between 
Unions and Civil Rights Organizations, 46 HOW. L.J. 49 (2002) (identifying the struggles in 
creating coalitions between labor and civil rights movements and the problems they both 
face). 
 4. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interest of blacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”); 
Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes—Interest 
Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 371 (2002) (noting 
“an impressive insight by Derrick Bell that gains for blacks coincide with white self-interest 
and materialize at times when elite groups need a breakthrough for African Americans, 
usually for the sake of world appearances or the imperatives of international competition”). 
In reflecting upon the death of Professor Bell shortly before the final stages of editing, the 
Author hopes that this Article and others will continue to highlight the enduring legacy of 
Professor Bell’s profound insights as developed through his interest-convergence analysis. 
 5. Bell, supra note 4, at 523. 
 6. See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
149, 150 n.10 (2011) (referring to interest-convergence framework as either a theory or a 
thesis while refusing to use the more “loaded” term of “dilemma” despite Professor Bell’s 
description of it as a dilemma). 
 7. See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003). 
 8. Driver, supra note 6, at 154 n.27 (describing the application of interest-convergence 
in employment discrimination law scholarship); see also Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race 
Discrimination Under Title VII After Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-
Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 940 (2005) (asserting that the interest-convergence theory 
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current statutory schemes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), or the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),9 any successful proposal must 
represent a win-win opportunity by also resolving broader workplace concerns for 
other primary stakeholders. This Article explores how the interest-convergence 
theory may be employed through the use of arbitration10 in the workplace to resolve 
racial problems for an employee represented by a union. African American 
employees seeking racial justice can form a more perfect union by converging their 
interests with key stakeholders, including employers, unions, and other employees 
who all desire effective and productive measures to resolve workplace disputes.11 
                                                                                                                 
can be employed to address racial discrimination in the workplace through alternative 
dispute resolution). 
 9. Most statutory employment discrimination laws are enforced by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Laws Enforced by the EEOC, U.S. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/ 
index.cfm (referring to the following laws, among others, that the EEOC enforces: Title VII 
(EEOC enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, e-5, e-12 (2006)); ADEA 
(EEOC enforcement authority codified at 29 U.S.C. § 628); and Title I of the ADA (EEOC 
enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12116)). 
 10. “Typically [a] more formal [version of dispute resolution] than mediation, 
arbitration involves the submission of a dispute to a third party (or a panel of third parties) 
who acts as a fact-finder and renders a decision after hearing arguments, including opening 
and closing statements, and reviewing evidence.” Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, 
Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post 
Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 66 n.2 (2008). In full disclosure, I admit 
that I am a labor arbitrator who is a member of the American Arbitration Association’s and 
Federal Mediation Conciliation Service’s labor arbitrator panels. However, my reasoning for 
using labor arbitration as a key tool to resolve statutory discrimination claims as described in 
this Article evolved years before I became a labor arbitrator. 
 11. In this Article, I focus on seeking racial justice for black employees in terms of 
discrimination in the workplace given the significant inequalities and disparities that have 
existed and continue to exist for black laborers. See generally SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO & 
STEVEN PITTS, CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH & EDUC., RESEARCH BRIEF: THE STATE OF BLACK 
WORKERS BEFORE THE GREAT RECESSION (2010), available at 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/blackworkers/blackworkers_prerecession10.pdf (describing 
systemic disparities in wages for black workers from a review of 2007 wages). For 
consistency, I use the term “black” interchangeably with “African American” when 
addressing race, especially when quoting or referring to other sources. I recognize that 
overall concerns about race are not two-dimensional and should not be limited by a 
black/white binary. See Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The 
“Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127, 134 (1998) 
(criticizing the black/white binary paradigm in discussing race from an outsider perspective 
as a Latino, neither white nor black). Because this binary can be helpful in providing general 
understanding, I have used it in this Article. See Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, 
Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 211, 215 n.16 (2002) (“[S]ome believe 
that the racial identity of all groups has been politically and legally defined by the line 
between Blackness and whiteness.”). This binary usage continues a practice from a prior 
article where I used the same paradigm to assess racial justice in the workplace involving 
unions. See Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination Disputes 
as a Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
55, 57 n.3 (2004).  
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With the current political climate regarding racial issues, any positive gains in 
resolving race discrimination claims in the workplace cannot come from new 
legislation through the Obama administration.12 Instead, those gains will have to 
come from within the workplace. Unions and their employee members must work 
together and with employers to resolve those disputes. Specifically, in this Article, 
two high-profile employment discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court 
during President Obama’s first year in office—Ricci v. DeStefano13 and 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett14—help identify a framework whereby employees with racial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. The first legislation that President Obama signed after his inauguration was the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which addressed the statute of limitations in pay discrimination cases 
and resulted as a congressional response to reverse a prior Supreme Court decision. See 
Richard Leiby, A Signature with the First Lady’s Hand in It, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2009, at 
C1 (describing President Obama’s signing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act); see also Lani 
Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
539, 539–40 (2009) (describing President Obama’s signing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009), and reversal of Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)). Whatever President Obama’s plans may have 
been with respect to advocating for pro-union and pro-antidiscrimination legislation when he 
first entered office, it is likely that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act may represent the only 
legislation of this type that will pass during his four-year term. When republican Scott 
Brown was elected in January 2010 to take over the U.S. Senate seat from Massachusetts, 
previously held by democratic senator Edward Kennedy, President Obama lost the 
opportunity to push through any desired pro-labor or employment discrimination legislation. 
See Paul Kane & Karl Vick, Republican Wins Kennedy’s Seat: Upset Shakes Democrats 
Result Could Derail Party Agenda, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2010, at A1. With Brown seated, 
the Democrats could no longer overcome any republican efforts to stop such legislation by 
calling for a filibuster supported by the now forty-one republican senators. See id.; see also 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Employment Arbitration: Keeping It Fair, Keeping It 
Lawful, 60 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 629, 629 (2010) (suggesting the election of President 
Obama in 2008 along with a democratic takeover of Congress and a “theoretically filibuster-
proof majority in the Senate” had inspired “organized labor and other traditional Democratic 
supporters” to seek the enactment of significant workers’ rights legislation). Whatever 
workplace legislation, if any, that may pass during the rest of President Obama’s term will 
likely focus on creating jobs, rather than addressing workplace discrimination, given the 
record levels of unemployment in the United States. See Marion Crain, Work Matters, 19 
KANSAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 365, 370 (2010) (describing overwhelming “[p]ublic demand for 
a governmental response to the unemployment problem”); Michael Z. Green, Unpaid 
Furloughs and Four-Day Work Weeks: Employer Sympathy or a Call for Collective 
Employee Action? 42 CONN. L. REV. 1139, 1146–47 & n.23 (2010) (identifying “jobs crisis” 
as top priority for the Obama administration and civil rights and labor organizations). Even 
more difficulties occurred when the Democratic Party lost control of the House of 
Representatives in the November 2010 midterm elections. See John Fritze, Hurdles Ahead 
for White House Agenda in Second Half of Term: Economic Concerns Shift Power to GOP, 
USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2010, at 1A (describing comments from a congressional scholar from 
the Brookings Institution, Thomas Mann, who asserted that the midterm November 2010 
elections will stymie chances for President Obama to pursue his agenda and “will [make it] 
hard for lawmakers to reach agreements on almost everything” now that Republicans control 
the House of Representatives). 
 13. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 14. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
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discrimination claims against their employers may work with their unions to 
effectively resolve their disputes through arbitration. This solution requires the 
union to make every effort to deal fairly and directly with all members of the union. 
The union will have to focus especially on working through these disputes with 
those members of different races than the claimants and those who may view the 
claims as invalid or even as a threat to their own employment gains. The key 
objective for all those involved is to find an interest-convergence when resolving 
race-based disputes through final arbitration. 
In Part I, this Article examines the current barriers to developing mechanisms to 
address race discrimination in our society and particularly in the workplace. Part II 
offers the historical development of arbitration in the union setting, so-called labor 
arbitration, and compares and contrasts this history with the separate and more 
recent development of arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims in 
the non-union setting, so-called employment arbitration. This history frames the 
legal landscape as it existed leading up to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ricci 
and Pyett. This history also explains how and why unions tended to avoid handling 
statutory employment discrimination matters by keeping them out of labor 
arbitration. In Part III, this Article discusses the details of the Ricci and Pyett cases 
and examines how each union involved in those disputes responded to the 
discrimination claims at issue.  
Part IV identifies the potential problems involved with creating a clear and 
unmistakable union waiver of an employee’s statutory right to pursue 
discrimination claims in court as occurred in Pyett. Part IV explains why these 
waivers should be allowed as long as employees can be provided with a fair 
arbitration forum to effectively vindicate their statutory rights as a form of interest-
convergence that addresses all the dilemmas for employers, employees, and 
especially unions when resolving statutory discrimination matters in arbitration. 
Part IV also establishes the analysis that should be used when assessing whether 
and how unions and employers can agree to these waivers. Part V concludes that by 
establishing the criteria in which these waivers will create an arbitration process to 
allow effective vindication of statutory rights, employers, unions, and mostly 
employees, will now have clarity and fairness in merging labor disputes with 
employment discrimination disputes. This interest-convergence merger can result 
in an appropriate arbitration process as allowed by Pyett and as circumvention of 
the type of court resolution process that arose in Ricci.15 
I. IDENTIFYING RACIAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN THE CURRENT WORKPLACE 
Workplace discrimination claims based on race filed at the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have reached record highs within the last three 
years.16 Even with the last two Supreme Court appointments made by President 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See infra Part IV.A–D. 
 16. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Reports Job Bias 
Charges Approach Hit Record High of Nearly 100,000 in Fiscal Year 2009 (Jan. 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-6-10.cfm (describing the EEOC 
workplace discrimination statistics for 2009 as including 93,277 workplace discrimination 
charges with race discrimination and retaliation being the most frequently filed charges and 
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Obama, the Court, as led by Chief Justice Roberts, provides little hope for those 
seeking a judicial remedy for racial discrimination as such claims have received 
little traction.17 As the interest-convergence theory suggests, African American 
employees will have to identify dispute resolution actions that will appeal to 
                                                                                                                 
how the EEOC’s enforcement, mediation, and litigation programs recovered more than $376 
million and these numbers for 2009 were only slightly lower than the all-time high numbers 
reached in 2008 for charges). “More than 47,000 people filed discrimination claims with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the first two quarters of its 2010 fiscal 
year—an 8% increase compared with the same period a year earlier.” Nathan Koppel, U.S. 
News: Claims Alleging Job Bias Rise with Layoffs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2010, at A6. Even 
more recently for 2010, race discrimination charges, which have “[h]istorically . . . been the 
most frequently filed charges since the EEOC became operational in 1965,” continue along 
with retaliation charges to be the leading areas of complaints filed with the EEOC. See Press 
Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, supra (referring to EEOC workplace 
discrimination statistics for 2010 as including an all-time high of 99,922 discrimination 
charges with retaliation charges of 36,528 slightly surpassing race charges of 35,890 as the 
most frequent type of charge filed). 
 17. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Wild West of Supreme Court Employment 
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 577, 577 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions in employment discrimination law indicate that these laws are being 
radically reshaped because “everything we thought we knew about employment 
discrimination is being rethought”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Court’s Conservatives Hold Sway 
in Employment Cases, 45 TRIAL, Sept. 2009, at 52, 52 (describing the first four terms of the 
Roberts Court as offering very little help for employees as the Court, in various five to four 
majorities that are not likely to change anytime soon, has repeatedly “favor[ed] employers 
over workers in employment discrimination cases” and “imposed significant new barriers to 
workers’ ability to get redress for discrimination”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the 
Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 413, 413, 419–23 (2009) (describing 
how the Court’s five to four majorities moved employment discrimination “in the 
conservative direction” in 2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
103, 104 (2009) (finding from an empirical study of federal courts that “[j]obs cases proceed 
and terminate less favorably for plaintiffs than other kinds of cases” and those who “appeal 
their losses or face appeal of their victories again fare remarkably poorly in circuit courts”); 
Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Labor and 
Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 253 (2009) (asserting that decisions 
in the Supreme Court’s 2008–09 term “suggest that the Court’s conservative majority is 
willing in fact to be quite radical” as it “reshaped the law that governs the workplace – or 
more specifically the law that governs whether and how employees will be permitted to 
access the courts to litigate workplace disputes”); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts 
Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful 
Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 511, 515–16, 553 (2003) (noting from a study of “every California 
employment law jury verdict reported in one or more of the state’s three major jury verdict 
reporters for the years 1998 and 1999” (internal citation omitted) that “[t]his study and many 
that preceded it, demonstrate that juries favor employers over employees in employment 
discrimination cases and are particularly skeptical of race discrimination claims by African 
Americans”); Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of Today’s Inequality, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 209, 210–11 (2011) (finding from a review “of 102 jury trials and 10 
bench trials” that “African Americans and Latinos claiming race discrimination have the 
lowest jury win rates”). 
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broader interests inside the workplace and also respond to the pervasive levels of 
race discrimination that still exist as evidenced by the increasing number of 
complaints.  
A. Workplace Racism in a Climate of Growing Resentment  
The landmark 2003 affirmative action decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,18 
authored by then-Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, referred to a future 
time (possibly twenty-five years after the Grutter decision) when race would no 
longer matter.19 However, O’Connor did acknowledge that in 2003, “race 
unfortunately still matters.”20 In a rush to reach Justice O’Connor’s prediction only 
five years after the Grutter decision, some commentators have claimed the 
existence of a colorblind and post-racial society as a result of the election of an 
African American president.21 These impetuous declarations about the end of 
racism create suspicion that these assertions themselves may be rooted in racism as 
a form of backlash against any racial justice gains in our society.22 Accordingly, 
any efforts aimed at aspiring to a colorblind or post-racial society further 
exacerbate racial discord regarding the handling of current issues of racism. 
The current resentment toward policies aimed at eradicating racial 
discrimination has evolved as part of a comprehensive challenge to the racial 
progress achieved by federal employment discrimination laws.23 Specifically, a 
group of “social conservatives” have been “actively developing a cultural and legal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 19. Id. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). 
 20. Id. at 333 (“Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular 
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique 
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately 
still matters.”). 
 21. See Bridgette Baldwin, Colorblind Diversity: The Changing Significance of “Race” 
in the Post-Bakke Era, 72 ALB. L. REV. 863, 869–71 (2009) (exposing the flaws in trying to 
ignore race by asserting that actions should be colorblind); andré douglas pond cummings, 
The Associated Dangers of “Brilliant Disguises,” Color-Blind Constitutionalism, and 
Postracial Rhetoric, 85 IND. L.J. 1277, 1277–78 (2010) (describing attempts at focusing on a 
color-blind constitutionalism as a “subtle affront” to affirmative action); see also Mario L. 
Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 
967, 968 (2010) (explaining that “post-racial” ideology as “vividly demonstrated in the 2008 
election of the first African-American President” involves the “belief in the declining 
significance of race in the United States” and it describes as a whole “a set of beliefs that 
coalesce to posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by 
America’s and Americans’ pronounced racial progress”).  
 22. See Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1141–43 (2010) 
(referring to the “present attraction to post-racialism” as establishing a form of post-racial 
discrimination that removes the disparate impact theory of discrimination from further 
consideration and diminishes the gains that arose from and could continue to accrue from the 
development of that theory). 
 23. Id. 
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movement to reverse the gains of the civil-rights movement.”24 This planned 
backlash towards continued racial progress resembles what President Obama has 
referred to as efforts to capitalize on the “anger” that exists in white communities 
where “opportunity comes to be seen as a zero sum game, in which your dreams 
come at my expense.”25 Those who have started to assert that we should ignore 
current issues of racism in our society have made it easier to “open[] the floodgates 
of white resentment when confronted with previously accepted and unquestioned 
civil rights inequities.”26 This concerted backlash in response to racial progress has 
also resulted in what President Obama referred to as the acts that “helped shape the 
political landscape for at least a generation” as “[t]alk show hosts and conservative 
commentators built entire careers unmasking bogus claims of racism while 
dismissing legitimate discussions of racial injustice and inequality as mere political 
correctness or reverse racism.”27 
Despite the attempts to assert that race no longer matters, a host of current 
events demonstrate ongoing racial problems in our society.28 In what the authors 
have referred to as “an exploratory empirical study of federal workplace racial 
harassment cases,” Pat K. Chew and Robert E. Kelley Jr. found the race of the 
judge matters.29 Specifically, in reviewing over 400 federal workplace harassment 
cases between 1981 and 2003, Chew and Kelley concluded that “African American 
judges held for the plaintiffs much more often than White judges.”30 Their findings 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1591 (2009). 
 25. Obama, supra note 1. 
 26. Cho, supra note 24, at 1596. 
 27. Obama, supra note 1. The ongoing narrative of conservatives who attack modern 
efforts to respond to discrimination in our society has been couched in an antidiscrimination 
rhetoric that assumes blacks and others who gained from the civil rights era have now 
attained equality. See Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the Name of Equal Rights: “Special” Rights and 
the Politics of Resentment in Post-Civil Rights America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 723, 724–25 
(2005) (describing how conservative activists have channeled backlash and resentment 
efforts against social changes derived from the civil rights era over the last fifty years). In 
pursuing this narrative, any proactive attempts aimed at continuing to eradicate 
discrimination in our society provide undeserved “special rights” to groups based on race 
and gender at the expense of white males which, itself, results in inequality and 
discrimination. Id. at 724 (referring to conservative assertions that equal rights and 
nondiscrimination principles are now being trampled upon by groups seeking “special 
rights” such as “women, African Americans, the physically and mentally disabled, Native 
Americans, and gays and lesbians”). 
 28. See Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias, Election ’08, and the 
Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 674, 676, 678, 681 (2010) 
(highlighting the use of racial messages in political campaigns from Nixon to Obama, and in 
particular, the significant degree of messages in the 2008 Obama campaign including 
suggesting that he was “too black,” that he resembled a “primate[],” direct racial slurs, 
claims that he was “unpatriotic, un-American, and even a foreigner,” and suggestive use of 
“interracial sexual taboo”). 
 29. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical 
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1117, 1146 (2009) 
(finding that “the logistic regression indicates that judges’ race in general is clearly 
associated with case outcomes”). 
 30. Id. at 1147. 
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suggest very explicitly that “African Americans and Whites apparently subscribe to 
different worldviews.”31 Their study also identified several examples of racist 
behavior occurring during the Obama presidential campaign, which further 
indicated that despite some societal growth in race relations, “racial harassment and 
discrimination continue to pervade American life.”32  
Other recent polls highlight how divided the country remains on race. For 
example, on August 28, 2011, the country prepared to explore its pride in improved 
race relations since civil rights demonstrations led by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 
the 1960s by dedicating the erection of a thirty-foot-plus sculpture of Dr. King in 
Washington as a memorial near similar monuments for Presidents Abraham 
Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson.33 Nevertheless, at the same time of this planned 
historic event, a USA Today/Gallup poll of 1319 adults from August 4–7, 2011, 
divided significantly by race over the questions of whether new civil rights laws are 
needed, whether the government should take an active role in improving social and 
economic positions for blacks, and whether job discrimination against blacks is 
persistent.34 Blacks consistently felt more strongly than whites about the continued 
existence of discrimination and the need for government and laws that address it.35 
Finally, as further evidence that racial problems still exist in our country, there is 
the somewhat recent example of the arrest of a prominent African American 
Harvard Professor, Henry “Skip” Gates Jr. in his Cambridge, Massachusetts, home 
by a white police officer on July 16, 2009.36 Issues of racial misunderstanding were 
highlighted during this incident.37 Harvard Law Professor Charles Olgetree, who 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. Id. at 1157. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Susan Page & Carly Mallenbaum, Poll: Racial Divisions Remain, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 18, 2011, at 1A; see also Susan Page, Views Differ on Degree of Change Since MLK, 
USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 2011, at 4A. The dedication ceremony for the Martin Luther King 
Monument was delayed until Sunday, October 16, 2011, because of health and safety 
concerns for those in Washington presented by Hurricane Irene on the date initially planned 
for the dedication of August 28, 2011. See Melanie Eversley, Fewer Expected for King Site 
Dedication, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 2011, at 3A.  
 34. Page & Mallenbaum, supra note 33, at 1A (noting that “[s]ix in 10 blacks say the 
government should take a major role in trying to improve the social and economic position 
of blacks” when only “one in five whites agree”; how “52% of blacks say new civil rights 
laws are needed” as “compared with 15% of whites”; and “nearly eight in 10 whites say 
blacks have an equal chance in their community to get any kind of job for which they are 
qualified” and in contrast “six in 10 African Americans say job discrimination remains 
persistent”).  
 35. Id. 
 36. See Martin Finucane, Review: Gates Arrest Was ‘Avoidable,’ BOS. GLOBE (June 30, 
2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2010/06/review_finds_bo.html. 
 37. See generally Elayne E. Greenberg, Dispute Resolution Lessons Gleaned from the 
Arrest of Professor Gates and “The Beer Summit,” 25 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 99, 106–12 
(2010) (asserting that the racial misunderstanding from the Gates incident highlighted 
ongoing conflicts in our society regarding racial profiling while the incident also resulted in 
suggesting the benefits of mediation in resolving these conflicts); see also Frank Rudy 
Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence 
Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1, 6–12 (2010) (describing details of the Gates 
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represented Gates, has written a book about the arrest38 and asserted that the 
incident demonstrated how much our society is still struggling with racism.39 
Ogletree and Johanna Wald have also explained that: 
Racial inequality is perpetuated less by individuals than by structural 
racism and implicit bias. Evidence of structural inequality is 
everywhere: in the grossly disproportionate numbers of young black 
men and women in prison; in the color of students shunted into 
remedial and special education tracks; in the stubborn segregation of 
our neighborhoods and schools; in the lack of recreational and 
academic opportunities for children of color in poor communities; in 
the inferior medical treatment people of color receive; and in the still 
appallingly small numbers of men and women of color in law firms, 
corporations and government.40 
B. Informal Resolution of Workplace Race Problems Without Bias 
As employers concentrate on resolving employment discrimination claims based 
on race, they will likely consider broader workplace goals aimed at removing 
barriers to worker productivity as an informal response to the pervasive level of 
these complaints.41 Employers could recast the resolution of these race 
                                                                                                                 
controversy). 
 38. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, THE ARREST OF HENRY 
LOUIS GATES, JR., AND RACE, CLASS, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (Palgrave Macmillan ed., 
2010). 
 39. See Tracey Jan, Q&A: Charles Ogletree on Gates’ Arrest, One Year Later, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 30, 2010, 4:44 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/ 
2010/06/_by_tracy_jan_g.html (describing Ogletree’s view that race still trumps class and 
how Harvard black law students report that they are “still suspected of committing crimes 
they did not commit” which proves that a “presumption of innocence doesn’t really exist for 
black males” and this is a “very disappointing and very painful” reality that “[w]e have not 
arrived”).  
 40. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Johanna Wald, Editorial, Race: The Discussion We 
Avoid, WASH. POST, July 25, 2010, at A19. For a recent study highlighting the significant 
racial discrimination that occurs in law firm hiring, see Monica R. Payne-Pikus, John Hagan 
& Robert L. Nelson, Experiencing Discrimination: Race and Retention in America’s Largest 
Law Firms, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553 (2010). Further proof of racial discrimination is 
indicated from a 2011 Pew Research Center study that shows the median wealth of white 
households is now twenty times that of black households, the highest this gap has ever been 
since the government began reporting this information twenty-five years ago. See PAUL 
TAYLOR, RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY, GABRIEL VELASCO & SETH MOTEL, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND 
HISPANICS: TWENTY-TO-ONE 1 (2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf.  
 41. See Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute 
Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
497, 508, 511–12, 519 (1993) (describing how employers’ efforts to adopt informal 
grievance procedures to resolve employment discrimination complaints do attempt to 
address legal concerns while they also subsume the legal concerns in support of 
management’s interests as well as they “minimize the intrusion of law on the smooth and 
efficient functioning of the organization”). There is a host of long-supported psychological 
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discrimination issues in favorable management terms related to: “‘developing 
rapport between employees and supervisors’; rectifying ‘management problems’ or 
‘poor work assignments’; reassigning people to avoid ‘personality clashes’; and 
‘improving communication.’”42 Also, any analysis of dispute resolution options for 
racial discrimination claims (other than those in formalized court systems) must 
make certain that these options will not represent a form of second-class justice 
only relegated to racial minorities who seek final resolution of their claims.43 
In a landmark 1985 article, Professor Richard Delgado and his coauthors44 
attacked the increasing use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve 
disputes for persons of color because of the risks of prejudice from informal 
resolutions.45 Using social science research, the authors argued that the informality 
of these methods of dispute resolution provided a negative impact on persons of 
                                                                                                                 
analysis that suggests that workers are more productive and happy when they are given some 
“voice” to resolve workplace disputes. See Thomas A. Kochan, Rethinking and Reframing 
U.S. Policy on Worker Voice and Representation, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231, 233 
(2011); see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American 
Economy, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 805 (2011) (referring to “a variety of theories suggesting” 
the value of “giving workers a say in the workplace”). But see Joshua C. Polster, Note, 
Workplace Grievance Procedures: Signaling Fairness but Escalating Commitment, 86 N.Y. 
U. L. REV. 638, 638–40 (2011) (asserting that notions of improved overall worker 
productivity as a result of offering fair grievance procedures comes at a cost of exacerbating 
workplace conflict by creating incentives for employees to become more committed to 
pursuing the grievance if it is initially denied, a result referred to as escalation which 
decreases worker productivity). 
 42. Edelman et al., supra note 41, at 530 n.26 (referring to comments made by 
management representatives who handle internal dispute resolution claims of employment 
discrimination and how they view the purposes behind their efforts to resolve those claims). 
 43. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits 
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (referring to concerns where a dispute 
resolution system such as the courts may have the perception of an unjust system that is 
designed only for the “haves” in our society to the exclusion of the “have-nots”). 
 44. Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, 
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; see also Susan K. Hippensteele, Revisiting the Promise of 
Mediation for Employment Discrimination Claims, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 211, 243 (2009) 
(stating Delgado’s hypothesis has “support from social scientific studies on decision-making 
and emotion”); Stephan Landsman, Nobody’s Perfect, 7 NEV. L.J. 468, 478 (2007) 
(acknowledging that “[i]n a number of different settings ADR processes have proven 
themselves hostile to the poor, the weak, and the one-shot players”). Maybe, these issues 
relate to concerns about race in negotiations. See Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of 
Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 
110 & n.3 (1995); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and 
Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 767, 778–80 (1996) (describing findings concluding that female and male claimants of 
color received less in mediation than similarly situated white claimants); Christine Rack, 
Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in the MetroCourt Study, 
20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 211 (1999) (describing data analyzing the disparate 
outcomes in bargaining for ethnic minorities, women and those with limited bargaining 
power in mediation). 
 45. Delgado et al., supra note 44, at 1388–89. 
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color.46 According to Delgado and his coauthors, being forced to pursue alternatives 
to the court system denies persons of color the application of certain norms and rules of 
procedure available in a court trial including “the flag, the black robes, the ritual—[to] 
remind those present that the occasion calls for the higher, ‘public’ values, rather than 
the lesser values embraced during moments of informality and intimacy.”47 Under this 
analysis, the “formality of adversarial adjudication deters prejudice,” because it 
counters “bias among legal decisionmakers and disputants” and it “strengthen[s] the 
resolve of minority disputants to pursue their legal rights.”48 More recently, Professor 
George Martinez described the same concerns as Delgado regarding the purported 
difficulties that racial minorities may face when asserting their rights in arbitration 
and other forms of ADR as follows: “minorities should avoid extra-legal/private 
associations such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR) which operate outside of 
the state’s legal system” because “[m]inorities do less well in less formal ADR 
settings.”49 
Although lack of formality may represent a concern for employees of color who 
want to address racial discrimination through arbitration and other forms of ADR, 
recent social science behavioral studies support the premise that if you want to 
reduce prejudice in the workplace, you should not suppress the identification of 
racial issues.50 Instead of pushing resolution of these racial issues to the courts or 
making prouder pronouncements that race no longer matters, effective human 
resource policies that encourage internal acknowledgement of these issues, while 
providing a fair resolution, would help better address workplace prejudice. With the 
current racial divide, employers, employees, and unions should be proactive in 
developing dispute resolution systems to converge their interests and resolve 
workplace disputes based on race. Despite his earlier racial prejudice criticisms of 
private dispute resolution, Delgado has also acknowledged that increasing concerns 
regarding the attainment of racial justice in the courts as a result of a “right-wing 
surge [in] this country . . . over the last few years” may demonstrate that “[t]he 
equation of ‘higher’ values with the public sphere is . . . not necessarily[] true” 
because “[m]any conservative judges and mean-spirited laws have been put in 
place.”51 If the public resolution of workplace discrimination through the courts 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Id. at 1402–03 (asserting that a key concern is that an entity with “high status” will 
pursue unfettered prejudices against someone of “low status” when formalism does not act 
as a check on that prejudice and this prejudice can stop claims from being “energetically” 
pursued).  
 47. Id. at 1388. 
 48. Id. at 1388–89. Delgado and his coauthors declared: “Formal rules also counter 
decisionmaker bias or consideration of extraneous issues.” Id. at 1400 n.307. 
 49. See George A. Martinez, Race, American Law and the State of Nature, 112 W. VA. 
L. REV. 799, 826–29 (2010) (internal citation omitted). 
 50. See Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and 
the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 401–12 (2008). 
 51. See Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Conflict as Pathology: An 
Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1391 n.1, 1399–1400 (1997) (quoting both 
Delgado and his alter ego Rodrigo). But see Phyllis E. Bernard, Minorities, Mediation and 
Method: The View from One Court-Connected Mediation Program, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1, 4–13 (2008) (disagreeing with Delgado’s original concerns about informality in 
alternatives to the court and asserting that those concerns are not valid). While being 
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does not represent a fair option, then the private resolution of these disputes in 
arbitration may offer a viable option of interest-convergence for employees, 
employers, and unions.52 
II. THE MERGER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
In the pursuit of interest-convergence regarding the handling of statutory 
employment discrimination claims in the union workplace, the merger of two 
previously unique forms of arbitration, labor arbitration (which exists only in a 
union setting) and employment arbitration (which had primarily existed only in a 
non-union setting until Pyett), must be explored. While having some similar 
components because they involve the resolution of worker disputes through 
arbitration, labor arbitration and employment arbitration do differ significantly.  
A. Labor Arbitration 
Historically, labor peace, an important policy goal under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA),53 has been advanced by fostering support for collective 
bargaining agreements between employers and unions.54 This labor law policy 
clearly applies when employers and unions agree to resolve their disputes through 
final and binding arbitration.55 Pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 1947 (“Section 301”),56 which amended the NLRA, the Supreme 
Court has developed a significant level of jurisprudence endorsing the resolution of 
labor disputes pursuant to collective bargaining agreements with binding arbitration 
as the final step.57 
                                                                                                                 
concerned about the informalities of using ADR, George Martinez has also recognized the 
great difficulties with pursuing race discrimination claims in court. See Martinez, supra note 
49, at 829–30.  
 52. See Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation 
Dilemma for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 16–17 (1999) (discussing the benefit of 
using mediation as part of the labor grievance arbitration process when handling a 
discrimination charge as better serving a union than trying to avoid any responsibility for 
addressing the matter in the grievance process); see also St. Antoine, supra note 12, at 641 
(describing arbitration benefits for employers in avoiding unpredictable juries and employees 
in better representing themselves and vindicating their statutory discrimination claims than 
in the courts).  
 53. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
 54. Specifically, section 1 of the NLRA acknowledges one of the findings that 
warranted the passage of the NLRA was the failure of employers to “accept the procedure of 
collective bargaining,” which “lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest.” 
Id. § 151. 
 55. See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455–56 (1957) 
(finding that the employer’s agreement to arbitrate acted as a quid pro quo for the 
employees’ agreement not to strike and avoid industrial strife). 
 56. Pub. L. 101, tit. 3, § 301, 61 Stat. 136, 156 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185 
(2006)). 
 57. Three decisions issued by the Supreme Court in 1960 (and all involving the 
Steelworkers Union) have become known as the “Steelworkers Trilogy.” See Julius Getman, 
Was Harry Shulman Right?: The Development of Arbitration in Labor Disputes, 81 ST. 
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Supreme Court cases decided pursuant to analysis under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA)58 have consistently enforced agreements to arbitrate statutory 
employment discrimination claims when applied in a non-union setting.59 However, 
in the labor union setting, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of arbitrating 
statutory employment discrimination claims solely as a matter under Section 301, 
while recognizing similarities with that analysis when compared with its analysis 
under the FAA.60 In an important case decided more than thirty-five years ago, 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,61 the Supreme Court found an individual 
employee could pursue a statutory discrimination claim in court even if the 
underlying dispute had been addressed in grievance arbitration pursuant to the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement.62 The Court also suggested that a union 
                                                                                                                 
JOHN’S L. REV. 15, 18 (2007). Those decisions made clear the federal labor policy pursuant 
to Section 301 of preferring the resolution of labor disputes through the collectively 
bargained grievance and arbitration process rather than using methods that cause industrial 
strife such as strikes. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
v. Enter. Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 58. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 59. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The Supreme Court further expanded the 
scope of its FAA jurisprudence regarding arbitration of statutory discrimination claims by 
allowing the parties to require the arbitrator, as opposed to the courts, decide the merits of 
challenges to arbitrate including whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable under 
state law. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779–81 (2010); see also 
David Horton, Arbitration As Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2011) (asserting that the 
Supreme Court has erroneously allowed the parties to delegate a lot of the key decision 
making about the scope of the FAA to the arbitrator instead of the courts as exemplified by 
its ruling in Jackson). The Court has recently expanded its limitations on the ability to 
challenge the validity of an agreement to arbitrate as unconscionable by preempting state 
laws that find it unconscionable to prohibit class arbitration claims. See AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011). For a broader discussion of the 
FAA’s enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims and preemption matters, see 
Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (2011); Hiro N. 
Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2011). For a more 
recent discussion of the Supreme Court’s overall FAA analysis and a positive assessment of 
the value of providing arbitration as a dispute resolution device for employees and 
consumers, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness 
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUST. L. REV. 457 
(2011). 
 60. Most recently, the Supreme Court has attempted to articulate some consistent 
analysis of its jurisprudence regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements under federal 
arbitration law via the FAA for non-labor cases versus enforcement of arbitration agreements 
under federal labor law via Section 301 for labor cases. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2859 n.6 (2010) (describing how “precedents applying the 
FAA . . . employ the same rules of arbitrability that govern labor cases”); see also United 
Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (finding the FAA does 
not apply to labor contracts “but the federal courts have often looked to the [FAA] for 
guidance in labor arbitration cases”). 
 61. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 62. Id. at 50 (finding “[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory 
rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual 
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could not agree to waive an individual employee’s future pursuit of statutory rights 
in court.63 
The law as established by Gardner-Denver had been consistently applied for 
thirty-five years until a change in 2009.64 Although Gardner-Denver and its 
progeny had suggested a rule that a union could not agree to waive an employee’s 
right to pursue a statutory claim in court,65 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit rejected that interpretation. Instead, the Fourth Circuit applied 
the Supreme Court’s more recent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory 
claims under the FAA to find that a union could agree to a waiver.66 This analysis 
left the issue of enforceability of union waivers as an unanswered question at least 
when looking at the conflict between the Fourth Circuit and other circuits.67  
On the other hand, an important component of the Court’s concerns in 
Gardner-Denver separates contractual issues that arise in labor arbitration from 
purely individual statutory issues that arise in employment arbitration. Labor 
arbitration reflects a “majoritarian” process pertaining to collective contractual 
rights, as opposed to the statutory employment discrimination rights of individual 
members.68 Under labor law, unions operate pursuant to the majority rule principle. 
                                                                                                                 
occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced 
in their respectively appropriate forums”). 
 63. Id. at 51. The Court subsequently suggested that prospective waivers by a union of 
an individual employee’s rights under other statutes would also not be enforceable. See 
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (suggesting that unions could 
not agree to prospective waivers of an employee’s right to pursue claims under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 in court); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) 
(suggesting that a union could not agree to prospective waivers of an employee’s right to 
pursue statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 in 
court). More recently, the Supreme Court has clarified that any suggestions from wording in 
Gardner-Denver, McDonald, and Barrentine that a union could not effectuate a prospective 
waiver of an individual employee’s statutory right to pursue those claims in court was dicta 
and an expansive misunderstanding of the Court’s holding in Gardner-Denver. See 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 n.8 (2009). 
 64. See Eric Sposito, 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Into the Abyss Between Judicial Process 
and Collectively Bargained Agreements to Arbitrate Individual Statutory Claims, 38 
RUTGERS L. REC. 173, 173 (2010) (“The Court’s opinion in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett 
overturned 35 years of jurisprudence, grounded in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. . . . .”). 
 65. See supra note 63 (discussing the suggestions from Gardner-Denver, McDonald, 
and Barrentine that a union could not agree to a prospective waiver of an employee’s pursuit 
of a statutory claim in court and how Pyett eventually rejected that suggestion). 
 66. See Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1999); Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Ann C. Hodges, 
Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit’s 
Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 123, 123–24 
(1998) (noting that the “Fourth Circuit is the only circuit thus far to have dismissed 
employee discrimination claims on the basis of an employee’s failure to arbitrate using a 
collectively bargained arbitration procedure” as “other circuits that have addressed the issue 
have refused to find that arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements bar 
judicial litigation of federal statutory claims” (internal citation omitted)).  
 67. See Hodges, supra note 66, at 130–40 (describing the conflict with the Fourth 
Circuit and other circuits). 
 68. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51–52 (implying that a union may waive certain 
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The collective strength of the members who selected the union becomes the focus, 
and the will of the majority may be imposed upon individual bargaining unit 
members despite their protests or superior individual positions.69 A key limitation 
on this concept of majority rule is that a union must fairly represent all the 
members in the bargaining unit including those who may not have voted for the 
union or agree with its actions.70 Nevertheless, a union may choose legitimately not 
to pursue some grievances to the final step of arbitration out of a concern for the 
general costs the entire union membership will incur both in terms of the financial 
impact and any detriment to the overall collective bargaining relationship.71 In 
recognizing the dilemmas a union must face when considering the disparate 
interests of its members who must all be fairly represented, the Court has found that 
a union’s exercise of discretion within its duty of fair representation may only be 
challenged for arbitrary actions.72 
                                                                                                                 
employee rights, like the right to strike, as part of a collective bargaining process to benefit 
the majority of its members, but a union may not waive prospectively employee rights to 
pursue a statutory employment discrimination claim which “concerns not majoritarian 
processes, but an individual’s right to equal employment opportunities”); see also Ronald 
Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case 
Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 
EMORY L.J. 135 (2000) (asserting the general concerns with giving unions the opportunity to 
waive the rights of their union members to pursue statutory discrimination claims and 
especially the concerns that unions may misuse this process to effectuate further 
discrimination). See generally Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary 
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 91–94 (1996) (describing labor arbitration). 
 69. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338–39 (1944) (explaining how majority 
interests can bind a dissenting employee to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
as individuals may not pursue their interests at the expense of the group’s interests); see also 
Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975) (finding that 
considerations of the national policy against workplace discrimination do not trump the 
concept of majority rule because “[i]n vesting the representatives of the majority with this 
broad power, Congress did not, of course, authorize a tyranny of the majority over minority 
interests” because individual employees’ minority interests still have protections through 
democratic union procedures, the limits of what the law deems to be an appropriate 
bargaining unit, and the limitations on union actions imposed by their duty of fair 
representation). 
 70. See generally Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) 
(finding that because a union is the exclusive representative, it is charged with a duty to 
represent fairly each of the employees as bargaining agent regardless of the majority 
members’ biases and decided under the Railway Labor Act); see also Syres v. Oil Workers 
Int’l Union, Local No. 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (finding the same duty of representation 
exists under the NLRA). 
 71. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191–192 (1967) (finding a union may not 
“arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion” and noting 
the need for “union discretion to supervise the grievance machinery and to invoke 
arbitration” provided that “both sides are assured that similar complaints will be treated 
consistently, and major problem areas in the interpretation of the collective bargaining 
contract can be isolated and perhaps resolved” while it prevents an individual employee from 
undermining the union and greatly increasing the costs of the grievance process so that 
arbitration would not function successfully). 
 72. See Marquez v. SAG, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 45–46 (1998) (finding a union needs “room 
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The question of whether an individual employee’s statutory discrimination claim 
represents the kind of dispute that may be collectively bargained to seek resolution 
through the grievance arbitration process involves a number of complex issues 
under both labor law and federal arbitration law. Some of the rationale for the 
Court’s finding in Gardner-Denver, including the inability of arbitrators to handle 
statutory employment discrimination claims, has subsequently been rejected by the 
Supreme Court in its FAA jurisprudence addressing employment arbitration in the 
non-union setting.73 
B. Employment Arbitration 
Employment arbitration, a process that has grown out of the Supreme Court’s 
approval of resolving an individual employee’s statutory employment 
discrimination claims in the non-union setting, works quite differently from labor 
arbitration. Unlike labor arbitration, which operates as a substitute for industrial 
strife, employment arbitration merely operates as a substitute for the judicial 
forum.74 This focus on providing a substitute for a judicial forum has allowed the 
development of employment arbitration under the FAA to follow the same path as 
commercial arbitration, which differs from labor arbitration.75 In enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate a statutory employment discrimination claim in the non-
union setting, and distinguishing this situation from a labor agreement to arbitrate, 
the Supreme Court has focused on the individual litigation aspects of what the 
arbitral forum offers as a substitute.76  
                                                                                                                 
to make discretionary decisions and choices, even if those judgments are ultimately wrong”); 
see also Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, “Labor’s Divided Ranks”: Privilege and the United 
Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1562–66 (1999) (describing the duty of fair 
representation and its potential for exploiting black workers’ rights to the exclusion of white 
male dominated unions); Green, supra note 11, at 79–80 (identifying the origins of the duty 
of fair representation as a concern about unions abusing the power of the majority to make 
discriminatory and racist decisions). 
 73. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (finding no concern 
with agreeing to use an arbitrator to resolve a statutory employment discrimination claim 
based on age and citing Supreme Court cases allowing parties to arbitrate statutory disputes 
under other federal laws including the Sherman Act, the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, 
and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). 
 74. See Albert Y. Kim, Comment, Arbitrating Statutory Rights in the Union Setting: 
Breaking the Collective Interest Problem Without Damaging Labor Relations, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 225, 238 (1998); Janet McEneaney, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in a Union Setting: 
History, Controversy and a Simpler Solution, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 137, 139–40 
(1997); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim [an 
employee] does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute [and] only submits 
to their resolution in the arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))). 
 75. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (“In 
the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here [a labor case] arbitration 
is the substitute for industrial strife.”).  
 76. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (finding the arbitration agreement should be enforced to 
apply to a statutory employment discrimination claim “[so] long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum” (second 
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Specifically, most of the judicial decisions involving enforcement of agreements 
to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims have focused on whether 
an employee can “effectively vindicate” his or her claim in the arbitral forum.77 The 
question of effective vindication has also led to concerns about the availability of 
discovery, remedies, and class actions along with issues about the costs of the 
arbitrator’s fees.78 These matters, and others addressing rights normally available in 
the judicial forum, call into question whether the arbitral forum provided so differs 
from the judicial forum that these distinctions create a substantive change rather 
than a mere procedural variation in the forum.79 
C. Keeping Labor and Employment Arbitration Separate Until Pyett 
Before Pyett, labor arbitration focused on the ongoing relationship of the parties, 
the union and the employer, and the prevention of industrial strife by insuring that 
employers have “just cause” before taking disciplinary action against employees. 
Although statutory employment discrimination claims and legal standards under 
those laws including issues regarding statutes of limitation, attorney’s fees, 
discovery, and punitive damages often arise in employment arbitration, those 
matters are addressed very rarely in labor arbitration if at all. With Gardner-
Denver80 controlling, unions could simply assert they could not waive employees’ 
rights to pursue their claims in court. This posture allowed the union to continue to 
distance itself from statutory discrimination matters by keeping those disputes 
separate from labor arbitration. By asserting that it could not waive employees’ 
rights to go to court, a union could also relieve itself of any worries about 
breaching its duty of fair representation if it chose not to pursue a statutory 
discrimination claim in arbitration. Nevertheless, employers seeking to resolve 
statutory discrimination claims in a single arbitral forum would desire an agreement 
from the union to waive the employees’ right to pursue the claim in court. 
                                                                                                                 
alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637)). 
 77. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and 
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 
397–98 (2006) (referring to the “effectively vindicate” doctrine as a creature of the court’s 
application of the FAA to allow statutory claims to be arbitrated); Stephen J. Ware, The Case 
for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration of Class 
Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 269–73 (2006) (describing the “effectively 
vindicate” doctrine along with its origins and applications); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 
(finding that arbitration is an adequate substitute forum to handle statutory discrimination 
claims as long as the employee “effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function” (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637)); Michael Z. Green, 
Ruminations About the EEOC’s Policy Regarding Arbitration, 11 EMPLOY. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 154, 181–84 & n.198 (2007) (describing same). 
 78. Green, supra note 77, at 181–184 & n.198; see also Michael Z. Green, Debunking 
the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination 
Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 429–31 (2000). 
 79. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28–29 (describing the right to pursue and effectively 
vindicate the same substantive rights in an arbitral forum versus a judicial forum is all that 
agreements to arbitrate accomplish and they do not change substantive rights). 
 80. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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The question of whether Gardner-Denver prohibited unions from agreeing to 
arbitrate via a waiver of employees’ individual statutory discrimination claims in 
the courts was uncertain, and labor practitioners and scholars hoped the Supreme 
Court would answer it in 1998.81 Unfortunately, in Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Service Corp.,82 the Court failed to answer that question. Instead, the Court, in 
Wright, specifically refused to decide whether a union could ever agree to such a 
waiver.83 The Court acknowledged that if a union could agree to a waiver of an 
employee’s right to pursue a statutory claim in court, the waiver would have to be 
clear and unmistakable.84 Because the provision in the collective bargaining 
agreement in Wright failed to establish a “clear and unmistakable waiver,” the 
Court resolved the matter without specifying what elements would be necessary to 
establish this type of waiver.85  
After Wright, most courts found that a union may not waive an employee’s 
statutory right to pursue employment discrimination claims in court.86 However, by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See Martin J. Oppenheimer & John J. Fullerton III, The Role of the Union in the 
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Claims, 55 DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2000, at 70, 72 
(noting that “the Supreme Court surprised many scholars and practitioners by expressly 
declining the invitation to hold that a union’s waiver of an employee’s right to a federal 
forum was never enforceable”).  
 82. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
 83. Id. at 77 (“[W]e find it unnecessary to resolve the question of the validity of a union-
negotiated waiver, since it is apparent to us, on the facts and arguments presented here, that 
no such waiver has occurred.”). 
 84. Id. at 80 (finding that the standard for enforcing a “union-negotiated waiver of 
employees’ statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination” is 
that the waiver must be “clear and unmistakable”).  
 85. Id. at 82 (“We hold that the collective-bargaining agreement in this case does not 
contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the covered employees’ rights to a judicial forum 
for federal claims of employment discrimination. We do not reach the question whether such 
a waiver would be enforceable.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 373–74 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(statutory rights cannot be consigned to the grievance process); Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 
F.3d 73, 75–77 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (finding that a clear and unmistakable waiver can 
occur only when the collective bargaining agreement: (1) contains a provision whereby 
employees specifically agree to submit all federal causes of action arising out of employment 
to arbitration, or (2) language explicitly incorporating the statutory anti-discrimination laws 
into the agreement to arbitrate); Albertson’s Inc. v. UFCW, 157 F.3d 758, 760–62 (9th Cir. 
1998) (statutory rights can never be prospectively waived through collective bargaining 
agreement); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363–65 (7th Cir. 1997) (the union 
cannot agree to assign statutory employment discrimination rights to the grievance process); 
Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525–27 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(statutory rights may not be waived through grievance process); see also Jonites v. Exelon 
Corp., 522 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that most courts since Wright have found 
that while an individual worker can waive his right to a judicial remedy, a union cannot do 
so on his behalf); Mary K. O’Melveny, One Bite of the Apple and One of the Orange: 
Interpreting Claims That Collective Bargaining Agreements Should Waive the Individual 
Employee’s Statutory Rights, 19 LAB. LAW. 185, 197 (2003) (“In considering statutory 
claims raised by employees subject to collectively bargained grievance remedies post-
Wright, most courts have continued to follow the Gardner-Denver paradigm, holding that 
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2007 a clear conflict had arisen in the federal courts. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has consistently applied Wright to find that language 
in a collective bargaining agreement banning discrimination in the workplace can 
constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of an employee’s right to pursue a 
statutory claim in court.87 On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit applied Wright and found that a union can never agree in a 
collective bargaining agreement to waive an employee’s statutory right to pursue a 
discrimination claim in court.88  
When addressing important questions regarding arbitration of statutory 
employment discrimination claims, the Court has a practice of sidestepping 
controversial issues to allow further development before returning to clarify those 
matters a decade later.89 By granting certiorari in Pyett, the Court appeared ready to 
close the gap it left open ten years earlier in Wright. In Pyett, the Court finally 
decided that a union could waive an employee’s right to pursue a claim in court 
through an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement.90 It was hoped 
that Pyett might also explain how the merger of principles under the NLRA 
regarding group concerns pertaining to labor arbitration can be reconciled with the 
broad principles under the FAA encouraging employment arbitration of individual 
statutory discrimination claims.91 Several scholarly commentators have lamented 
                                                                                                                 
the contractual grievance machinery was insufficient to establish a ‘clear and unmistakable 
waiver’ . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 87. See, e.g., Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 
(finding that parties’ provision in the collective bargaining agreement to “abide by all the 
requirements of Title VII” and that “unresolved grievances arising under this [provision] are 
the proper subjects for arbitrations” was enough to waive employees’ statutory right to 
pursue employment discrimination claims in court); see also Aleman v. Chugach Support 
Serv., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 215–18 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding a “clear and unmistakable waiver” 
in the following language: “The parties expressly agree that a grievance shall include any 
claim by an employee that he has been subjected to discrimination under Title VII . . . and/or 
all other federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws” even if the employees did not 
understand the language in the agreement because they did not speak English). 
 88. See Pyett v. Penn. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 89. For example, in the 1991 Gilmer decision, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time 
that employees could be required to arbitrate their statutory employment discrimination 
claims. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). However, the Court 
in Gilmer sidestepped the issue of whether the FAA excluded employment agreements from 
coverage by finding that the actual agreement to arbitrate in the case was not an employment 
agreement, and the Court would leave the question of whether the FAA excluded 
employment agreements from its coverage for “another day.” Id. at 25 n.2. Then in 2001, the 
Supreme Court answered that question in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001), by finding the FAA’s employment agreement exclusion was limited to employment 
agreements involving transportation workers and all other workers’ employment agreements 
are covered by the FAA. Id. at 119. 
 90. 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1473–74 (2009) (finding that a clear and unmistakable waiver of 
the employees’ right to pursue their statutory claims in court had been agreed to by the union 
and the employer). 
 91. Several commentators have recently addressed the key impacts of the Pyett decision 
and its acceptance of the merger of employment discrimination disputes into labor 
arbitration. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: 
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the Court’s ruling in Pyett as it treads upon the generally understood principle from 
the last thirty-five years whereby employees could pursue statutory discrimination 
claims without being compelled to raise those claims through their union 
representatives in arbitration.92 In reviewing Pyett along with the Court’s decision 
in Ricci,93 one may be able to discern a way to develop an effective merger of 
principles from labor arbitration with principles from employment arbitration to 
provide a successful resolution of race-discrimination claims in the union 
workplace. 
                                                                                                                 
Impact of the Pyett Decision on Collective Bargaining, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 23, 28–32 
(2009) (reviewing the practical implications of Pyett for employers, unions, and employees); 
Mark Berger, A Step Too Far: Pyett and the Compelled Arbitration of Statutory Claims 
Under Union-Controlled Labor Contract Procedures, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (2009) 
(exploring the reasoning behind Pyett and addressing how potential qualifications in Pyett 
may be dealt with in the future); Charles D. Coleman, Is Mandatory Employment Arbitration 
Living Up to Its Expectations? A View from the Employer’s Perspective, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 227, 228 (2010) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of mandatory 
employment arbitration from an employer’s perspective); Brendan D. Cummins & Nicole M. 
Blissenbach, The Law of the Land in Labor Arbitration: The Impact of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 159 (2010) (examining the reasoning, analyzing the 
practical application, and addressing unanswered questions from Pyett); Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt & Todd Dvorak, Review of Labor and Employment Decisions from the United 
States Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Term, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 107, 135–38 (2010) 
(addressing the unanswered legal questions from Pyett); Roger B. Jacobs, Supreme Court 
Tips Against Individual Rights—Again, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 267, 278–310 (2010) 
(discussing the likely effect of Pyett on individual rights); Mark S. Mathison & Bryan M. 
Seiler, What 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett Means for Employers: Balancing Interests in a 
Landscape of Uncertainty, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 173 (2010) (contending that Pyett 
“does not radically change the calculus for employers as to the advisability of seeking an 
agreement from a union to arbitrate statutory claims”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The NLRA’s 
Legacy: Collective or Individual Dispute Resolution or Not?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
249, 259 (2011) (describing the results from the Pyett decision and stating that the “inclusion 
of statutory rights within collective bargaining agreements with arbitration clauses” will now 
“make the use of labor grievance arbitration processes look close to fully merged with 
[employment discrimination] contractual arbitration”); Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of 
Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 825, 826 (2010) (asserting that Pyett demonstrates how the Court is willing to 
“disregard[] a statute’s text, its legislative history,” and judicial precedent to fashion a law to 
“suit its own policy preferences”). 
 92. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Casebeer, Supreme Court Without a Clue: 14 Penn Plaza LLC 
v. Pyett and the System of Collective Action and Collective Bargaining Established by the 
National Labor Relations Act, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063 (2011); Alan Hyde, Labor 
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Letting Discrimination 
Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. RESOL. 975 
(2010); Michael H. LeRoy, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Judicial 
Review Under the Steelworkers Trilogy and the Federal Arbitration Act, 2010 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 89. 
 93. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
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III. RICCI AND PYETT: WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT UNION RACIAL JUSTICE 
Firefighters and their unions seem to pose unique and interesting issues 
regarding racial divisions.94 In reviewing the Ricci v. Destefano decision,95 and its 
handling of the racial divisions in the New Haven, Connecticut fire department, one 
can understand a lot about the difficulties of addressing race discrimination in the 
courts. Also, the Ricci decision highlights the problems for unions when their 
members become divided over race discrimination complaints. On the other hand, 
the Pyett decision and the Court’s approach to dealing with union agreements that 
waive employees’ rights to pursue statutory discrimination claims in court96 
provides a framework to understand how a union could help its employee members 
avoid the harsh results of the court system through arbitration. But the specific 
components of a waiver that would effectively remedy a statutory race 
discrimination claim through an agreement to arbitrate, while also addressing the 
union’s duty of fair representation, will have to be developed through lower court 
decisions interpreting Pyett. 
A. The Decisions in Ricci and Pyett 
1. Ricci  
In Ricci, the Court found that the City of New Haven had engaged in intentional 
racial discrimination under Title VII by refusing to certify the results of a 
promotion test it believed had a disparate impact on black firefighters.97 Justice 
Kennedy borrowed from constitutional law involving affirmative action to create a 
new statutory standard, “strong basis in evidence,” for defending against this type 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. See Green, supra note 11, at 87–92 (describing unique racial problems and 
divisiveness involving African American and white Chicago firefighters and their union). 
Even within the New Haven, Connecticut fire department, where the Ricci dispute 
originated, there was a long history of discrimination against African Americans and 
Latinos. See Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a “Post-Racial” World, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 848 n.40 (2011). However, firefighter unions are not the only unions 
that still have to address major concerns regarding discrimination within their own ranks. See 
generally Emily White, Comment, “Not Our Problem:” Construction Trade Unions and 
Hostile Environment Discrimination, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 245, 245–46 & nn.4 & 6 (2006) 
(citing various Susan Eisenberg articles in WE’LL CALL IF WE NEED YOU: EXPERIENCES OF 
WOMEN WORKING CONSTRUCTION 21, 49–50 (Cornell Univ. Press 1998)) (describing 
concerns with discrimination in construction trade unions who have historically sought to 
exclude women and minorities from membership by employing various tactics); see also 
Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment: 
The Untold Story, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 30 & n.95 (1995). 
 95. 129 S. Ct. at 2674 (finding that the City of New Haven discriminated against several 
white and one Hispanic firefighters by refusing to certify promotion exam results in order to 
avoid disparate impact discrimination claims by black firefighters). 
 96. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (“We hold that a 
collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to 
arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of law.”).  
 97. 129 S. Ct. at 2674. 
2012] RACIAL JUSTICE UNION ARBITRATION 389 
 
 
of discrimination claim under Title VII.98 In 2003, the City administered a written 
test as part of its selection process to determine which firefighters were eligible for 
promotion.99 The test constituted sixty percent of the promotion process and the 
other forty percent was based on an oral exam. Any successful firefighters had to 
be chosen from among the top three scorers on the list, which would remain valid 
for two years.100 Seventy-seven firefighters completed the examination for 
promotion to lieutenant and forty-one firefighters completed the examination for 
promotion to captain.101  
For the lieutenant position, thirty-four firefighters passed the test.102 Twenty-five 
were white, six were black, and three were Hispanic.103 The relative pass rates on 
the test were 58.1% for white test takers, 36.1% for black test takers, and 20% for 
Hispanic test takers.104 Because the City had to take the top three scorers on an 
exam, the ten firefighters eligible for promotion to lieutenant were all white.105 
Twenty-two firefighters passed the captain examination.106 Sixteen were white, 
three were black, and three were Hispanic.107 On this exam, the pass rate for white 
test takers was 64%, while the pass rate for black and Hispanic test takers was 
37.5%.108 The nine candidates eligible for promotion included seven white and two 
Hispanic firefighters.109 These numbers presented a racially adverse impact 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination against 
the black firefighters under Title VII.110 
As soon as the exam results were made publicly available, several of the 
participants became divided about the results.111 Some argued the tests should be 
discarded because the results showed the test to be discriminatory.112 Others 
threatened that a discrimination lawsuit could be imminent if the City made 
promotions based on the tests.113 Yet, others asserted the exam was fair and the 
results should be certified.114 Fearing there was a significant disparate impact based 
on race in the test results, the City refused to certify the results.115 Because of the 
City’s refusal to certify the test results, several firefighters, including seventeen 
white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter, filed the suit in Ricci charging race 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Id. at 2664. 
 99. Id. at 2666. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 2678. 
 105. Id. at 2666. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2678. 
 109. Id. at 2666. 
 110. Id. at 2677; see also id. at 2692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2664. 
 114. Id. at 2667–70. 
 115. Id. at 2671. 
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discrimination and alleging violations of their rights under the Constitution and 
under Title VII.116  
The City argued that its good-faith belief that certifying the exam would expose 
it to liability for disparate impact racial discrimination against the black firefighters 
shielded the City from liability for disparate treatment towards the Ricci 
plaintiffs.117 The Ricci plaintiffs argued that the City’s good-faith belief was not a 
valid defense to their disparate treatment claims.118 The district court granted 
summary judgment for the City and noted that “motivation to avoid making 
promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact” could not constitute 
discriminatory intent against the Ricci plaintiffs.119 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court.120 
The Supreme Court reversed, granted summary judgment to the Ricci plaintiffs, 
and found that the City of New Haven had intentionally discriminated against them 
on the basis of race by deciding not to certify the exam results.121 One commentator 
found this grant of summary judgment after creating a new rule and applying it in 
the case to be a “startling departure from the Court's usual practice” of remanding 
the case and allowing the lower courts to apply the new rule.122 Apparently, “[t]he 
Ricci majority was unwilling to allow . . . normal litigation processes to play 
themselves out in this case or even to explain why such an unusual course of action 
might have been appropriate in this circumstance.”123 
The overall racially divisive issues for firefighters at New Haven continue 
despite the Supreme Court’s ruling. In Briscoe v. City of New Haven,124 a case filed 
after the Ricci decision, a black firefighter sued the New Haven fire department 
claiming its promotion tests had a disparate impact on minorities.125 The Briscoe 
case was previously dismissed for failure to state a claim as the district court 
concluded that Briscoe’s suit was precluded by the Ricci decision’s suggestion that 
a claim of disparate impact based on the same test scores at issue in Ricci would be 
unsuccessful.126 In Briscoe’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit found that the Ricci decision, and its favorable ruling for the 
plaintiffs in that case which has now settled, did not preclude Briscoe from seeking 
relief based on disparate impact as long as Briscoe’s relief does not “interfere with 
the relief—present and future—afforded to the Ricci plaintiffs by the certification 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2671. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006)). 
 120. Id. at 2672. 
 121. Id. at 2681. 
 122. Hart, supra note 17, at 257. 
 123. Id. 
 124. No. 3:09-cv-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794212, at *1 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010), 
clarified on reconsideration by No. 3:09-cv-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794231(D. Conn. July 
12, 2010), vacated, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at *5–*7 (citing Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681 and referring to language in that 
decision stating that “[i]f . . . the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then in light of our 
holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid disparate-impact liability”). 
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of the exam results.”127 Regardless of the final resolution in the Briscoe case, all 
that has occurred so far demonstrates the convoluted effect when neither the 
employer nor the union sought a convergence-of-interest resolution to the racially 
divisive promotion process used for firefighters at the City of New Haven. 
2. Pyett 
On April 1, 2009, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett.128 In a five to four majority opinion (authored by Justice 
Clarence Thomas, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, 
Anthony Kennedy, and Antonin Scalia), the Court held that a union can agree to 
waive individual employees’ statutory rights to pursue age discrimination claims in 
court.129 Dissenting opinions were filed by Justice John Paul Stevens and by Justice 
David Souter, who was joined by Justice Stevens, along with Justices Stephen 
Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.130 According to the Court, a clear and 
unmistakable waiver of court access can be achieved by agreeing explicitly to 
resolve statutory discrimination claims under the arbitration process covered within 
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).131 The plaintiffs were three employees, 
all over forty years of age, who worked as night lobby watchmen and in other 
positions for Temco Services Industries, a maintenance service contractor.132 They 
sued Temco for age discrimination when they were reassigned to less desirable and 
lower paying jobs after a new security company was hired at their work location.133 
Temco is part of a management association of contractors and business owners, the 
Realty Advisory Board, which negotiated a CBA with the union, Local 32BJ of the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU Local 32BJ).134 SEIU Local 32BJ 
initially processed the age discrimination claims to arbitration but then withdrew 
the claims because it had consented to the placement of the new security firm at the 
employees’ work location.135 The specific CBA in Pyett provided clear language 
stating:  
§ 30 NO DISCRIMINATION. There shall be no discrimination against 
any present or future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age, 
disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Mark 
S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Triumph of White 
Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 190–91 (2011) (criticizing the lower court 
decision in Briscoe as “confer[ring] binding application to pure dicta” in Ricci in an effort to 
preclude a black employee “whose interests were not remotely represented by any party” 
from pursuing litigation on disparate impact issues that were never addressed in the Ricci 
decision).  
 128. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 129. Id. at 1460, 1474. 
 130. Id. at 1474, 1476 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 1466 (majority opinion). 
 132. Id. at 1461–62 & n.3. 
 133. Id. at 1461–62. 
 134. Id. at 1461.  
 135. Id. 
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characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims 
made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New 
York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights 
Code . . . . All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and 
arbitration procedures (Articles V and VI) as the sole and exclusive 
remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in 
rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination.136 
In addressing this matter, the Court had to navigate complex issues regarding the 
merger of principles under three different statutory regimes: the FAA, the ADEA, 
and the NLRA.137 The Court in Pyett rejected the lower court’s finding that the 
decision in Gardner-Denver forbids enforcement of judicial forum waivers in a 
CBA.138 In Pyett, the Court reviewed the specific CBA language authorizing 
resolution of statutory discrimination claims pursuant to the arbitration process.139 
Given the Court’s indications in Wright that a union waiver might be possible,140 
the clear language from the CBA provision stating that “[a]ll such [discrimination] 
claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures . . . as the sole 
and exclusive remedy . . . [whereby] [a]rbitrators shall apply appropriate law,”141 
and the Court’s prior decisions broadly endorsing the use of arbitration to resolve 
statutory claims as a strong policy of the FAA,142 the Court’s finding in Pyett that a 
clear and unmistakable waiver existed should not have presented much of a 
surprise.  
Without relying on Wright, the Pyett case rejected as “dicta” the longstanding 
concern from Gardner-Denver about balancing the conflict between majoritarian 
principles under labor law with individual principles embodied in statutory 
discrimination law.143 The Court also found that this conflict-of-interest concern 
was not a limit to be read into the ADEA.144 As Justice Thomas suggested, the 
failure to focus on Wright and its similar reasoning for requiring a clear and 
unmistakable waiver appeared to be aimed at the Court’s desire to circumvent 
thirty-five years of precedent without expressly overruling Gardner-Denver:  
Wright . . . neither endorsed Gardner-Denver’s broad language nor 
suggested a particular result in this case. . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1469–1473. 
 138. Id. at 1463. 
 139. Id. at 1461, 1469 (identifying the specific arbitration language in the CBA regarding 
discrimination claims and finding this “arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory 
and contractual discrimination claims”). 
 140. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77 (1998) (“[W]e find 
it unnecessary to resolve the question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver, since it is 
apparent to us, on the facts and arguments presented here, that no such waiver has 
occurred.”). 
 141. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1461. 
 142. Id. at 1469–70. 
 143. Id. at 1469 & n.8. 
 144. Id. at 1472. 
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 Because today’s decision does not contradict the holding of 
Gardner-Denver, we need not resolve the stare decisis concerns raised 
by the dissenting opinions. . . . But given the development of this 
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence in the intervening years, . . . Gardner-
Denver would appear to be a strong candidate for overruling if the 
dissents’ broad view of its holding . . . were correct.145 
Ironically, in suggesting that Gardner-Denver should be overruled if its broad 
prospective waiver ban was correct, Justice Thomas quoted a case for support 
where the Court had overruled longstanding precedent and changed the 
interpretation of another antidiscrimination law.146 But shortly after that decision, 
Congress stepped in and reversed the Court’s action.147 So while the Court in Pyett 
seemed focused on rejecting longstanding precedent without explicitly overruling 
Gardner-Denver, it failed to confront the concern that a union could waive an 
individual employee’s right to court access on one hand and then on the other hand 
decide not to pursue that same claim in arbitration within the limits of the NLRA’s 
duty of fair representation analysis.  
Would a union’s decision to not pursue a claim through arbitration prevent an 
individual employee’s statutory claim from being effectively vindicated? The Court 
called it “speculation” to resolve this issue because of factual disputes that had not 
been fully briefed or covered in earlier proceedings.148 In his dissent, Justice David 
Souter asserted the Pyett decision may have no impact due to its failure to address 
this issue: “On one level, the majority opinion may have little effect, for it 
explicitly reserves the question whether a CBA’s waiver of a judicial forum is 
enforceable when the union controls access to and presentation of employees’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Id. at 1469 nn.7–8 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 146. Id. (asserting “that it is appropriate to overrule a decision where there ‘has been [an] 
intervening development of the law’ such that the earlier ‘decision [is] irreconcilable with 
competing legal doctrines and policies’” (alteration in original) (quoting Patterson v. 
McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989))). 
 147. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071–72 
(creating language pursuant to section 101 that reverses the Patterson v. McClean Supreme 
Court decision limiting the scope of coverage under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); see also Jones v. 
R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 384 (2004) (“The 1991 [Civil Rights] Act 
overturned Patterson . . . .”); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 305–14 (1994) 
(discussing how section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which created new section 42 
U.S.C. § 1981(b), was enacted to reverse the Court’s prior decision in Patterson); H.R. REP. 
NO. 102-40 (I) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 540; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II), at 2 
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694–695 (“The Act overrules the Supreme 
Court’s 1989 decision in Patterson v. McClean Credit Union . . . and restor[es] the broad 
scope of Section 1981.”). 
 148. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1474 (“Respondents also argue that the CBA operates as a 
substantive waiver of their [statutory] rights because it not only precludes a federal lawsuit, 
but also allows the Union to block arbitration of these claims. . . . [W]e are not positioned to 
resolve in the first instance whether the CBA allows the Union to prevent respondents from 
‘effectively vindicating’ their ‘federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum,’ . . . [as] 
[r]esolution of this question at this juncture would be particularly inappropriate in light of 
our hesitation to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of speculation.” (quoting 
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000))).  
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claims in arbitration . . . which ‘is usually the case.’”149 Given the Court’s history 
of leaving an arbitration question unanswered for several years until the lower 
courts have fleshed it out, Justice Souter is likely correct in asserting that Pyett may 
ultimately have little effect other than establishing that a union may agree to a clear 
and unmistakable waiver. 
Important policy considerations warrant against enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement when the agreement in practice precludes an employee from effectively 
vindicating his or her statutory discrimination claims in labor arbitration because 
the agreement to arbitrate subsumes the substantive statutory right to relief.150 After 
the Pyett decision, a few cases filed in the federal district court in New York 
suggest that if the union controls the right to present the claim and does not pursue 
the claim in arbitration, the employee may still be able to pursue the claim in court. 
For example, in Morris v. Temco Serv. Indus., Inc., a case involving the same 
union, SEIU Local 32BJ, the same service employer, Temco Industries, and the 
same agreement language as in Pyett, the union did not pursue the employee’s 
discrimination claim.151 The court decided not to compel Morris to arbitrate her 
discrimination claim because SEIU Local 32BJ prevented her from arbitrating the 
claim by not pursuing it.152 The court found under those circumstances the 
arbitration provision need not be enforced and Morris was free to pursue her 
discrimination claim in federal court.153  
A similar result occurred in Kravar v. Triangle Services, Inc.154 The employer’s 
motion to compel arbitration was dismissed because the union (SEIU Local 32BJ) 
refused to arbitrate the claim, and the CBA expressed that only the union could file 
a grievance and pursue arbitration of that grievance.155 As the rulings in both 
Morris and Kravar establish, when a union agrees to a Pyett waiver but chooses to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. Id. at 1481 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (quoting McDonald v. 
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984)). 
 150. See Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., L.P., 928 N.E.2d 383, 387 (N.Y. 2010) 
(referring to a “strong state policy favoring arbitration agreements and the equally strong 
policy requiring the invalidation of such agreements when they contain terms that could 
preclude a litigant from vindicating his/her statutory rights in the arbitral forum”). The court 
in Brady recognized that the strong state policy of invalidating agreements to arbitrate that 
precludes an employee from vindicating statutory rights is derived from the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Gilmer requiring that a “prospective litigant [must be able to] effectively . . . 
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action . . . .” Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
 151. No. 09 Civ. 6194(WHP), 2010 WL 3291810, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010).  
 152. Id. at *5–6. 
 153. See id. 
 154. No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009). Other 
cases involving the same or similar contract language as in Pyett also indicate that if the 
union does not pursue the claim, the employee may take the statutory discrimination claim 
into court. See, e.g., Borrero v. Ruppert Hous. Co., No. 08 CV 5869(HB), 2009 WL 
1748060, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009) (“Should [plaintiff]’s attempts to arbitrate his 
claims be thwarted by the Union, the CBA will have operated as a ‘substantive waiver’ of 
his statutorily created rights and he will have the right to re-file his claims in federal court.”). 
 155. See F. Ryan Van Pelt, Note, Union Refusal to Arbitrate: Pyett’s Unanswered 
Question, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 515, 517. 
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not pursue an employee’s statutory discrimination claim through arbitration, the 
employee may still pursue these claims in court.  
B. A Tale of Two Different Unions in Ricci and Pyett 
When looking at the role of unions in assisting their employees to develop 
employment discrimination claims, it is helpful to understand the nature of the 
conflict and the union’s duty to fairly represent all the members of the union. 
United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell explained the complexities of 
this duty in 1987: “Like other representative entities, unions must balance the 
competing claims of [their] constituents. A union must make difficult choices 
among goals such as eliminating racial discrimination in the workplace, removing 
health and safety hazards, providing better insurance and pension benefits, and 
increasing wages.”156 
When discrimination disputes place one union member at odds with another 
union member, the question becomes “what role should the union play?”157 Other 
than trying to figure out how to adequately and impartially represent all the 
members involved, the union has few options.158 The Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gardner-Denver and the subsequent application of that holding until the Pyett 
decision allowed unions a clear option to wash their hands of any role in the 
handling of a statutory discrimination claim.159  
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 688–89 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 157. See Alleyne, supra note 52, at 4–8 (describing the potential conflicts for unions in 
sexual harassment disputes between employees and describing duty of fair representation 
issues for unions in processing sexual harassment claims that pit one union member (the 
female complainant) against another union member (the alleged male harasser)); Sally E. 
Barker & Loretta K. Haggard, A Labor Union’s Duties and Potential Liabilities Arising out 
of Coworker Complaints of Sexual Harassment, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 135, 141–45 
(1992) (describing overall complexity of conflicts regarding a union’s role in processing 
sexual harassment claims and conflicts pitting members against each other including 
promotions and fights); Crain, supra note 94, at 32 nn.104–05 (describing how claims of 
sexual harassment by one union member against another divides the union); McEneaney, 
supra note 74, at 159–60 (describing a case where a claim of religious discrimination 
accommodation pitted one member against others due to seniority, and the union still took 
the case to arbitration (citing Breech v. Ala. Power Co., 962 F. Supp. 1447 (S.D. Ala. 1997)). 
 158. See Barker & Haggard, supra note 157, at 145 (noting that a “union may avoid DFR 
liability if it represents all alleged wrongdoers impartially”). 
 159. It is generally understood that unions try to avoid the filing of discrimination claims 
in the grievance process that will pit one union member against another. Crain, supra note 
94, at 14 & n.15 (describing the author’s survey of hostile environment discrimination cases 
in the union setting that found that unions tend to discourage female members from filing 
charges of sexual harassment against male union members); see also Crain & Matheny, 
supra note 72, at 1552–53 (describing Crain’s survey study and also highlighting specific 
instances of union failure to pursue discrimination grievances brought by female union 
members at a Mitsubishi plant); McEneaney, supra note 74, at 171 (“Unions would avoid 
potential conflicts of interests and suits for breaches of the duty of fair representation; in fact, 
unions would need only point the way to the nearest EEOC office.”). 
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This pre-Pyett hands-off approach by the union presented a “win-win” result for 
the union and the employee. In convincing an employee to pursue a discrimination 
claim in court, the union benefits by circumventing a duty of fair representation 
challenge or a direct claim of discrimination against the union regarding how it 
handled the statutory discrimination claim in arbitration. The employee also 
benefits by being able to pursue the discrimination claim for full relief in the courts 
on his or her own terms without having to defer to the decisions of the union. 
However, employers do not benefit by having to resolve related disputes in 
multiple forums with the potential for conflicting results and ongoing concerns 
about large jury verdicts and litigation costs.160 
On the other hand, employers may benefit from offering their employees 
arbitration as an option to resolve statutory discrimination claims if employees have 
a positive perception of the fairness of that process, and the employer can resolve 
all disputes in the arbitral forum.161 Likewise, unions may see the benefits of 
embracing arbitration of statutory discrimination claims for their members, as SEIU 
Local 32BJ did when it entered into the agreement at issue in Pyett. Key Supreme 
Court discrimination cases, including a statutory ADA claim in Wright162 and a 
statutory Title VII retaliation claim in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad 
Co. v. White,163 involved employee grievances where the union apparently could 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. See St. Antoine, supra note 12, at 641 (asserting that arbitration offers employers 
“fewer devastating jury verdicts and lower litigation costs”); Erica F. Schohn, The Uncertain 
Future of Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 334 n.92 (2004) (identifying that “employers accept settling a greater 
number of minor disputes in exchange for avoiding a major suit that settles for seven figures 
before a sympathetic jury”); see also Hoyt N. Wheeler, Unions and the Arbitration of 
Statutory Rights, 14 PERSP. ON WORK, Summer 2010/Winter 2011, at 26, 28 (asserting the 
benefits for unions and employers in pursuing arbitration as employers are not subject to 
multiple forums and the “tender mercies of a jury” and unions can use the arbitration 
agreement as an organizing tool when it finds a more amenable employer willing to work 
with a union on such issues). But see David L. Gregory & Edward McNamara, Mandatory 
Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims, and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. 
Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429, 456 (2010) (asserting that “employers pleased 
with the unitary, integrated result achieved in Pyett may come to rue the day” when they did 
not have to worry about statutory claims in labor arbitration). 
 161. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”? How Coke’s One-Way 
Binding Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 77, 108–21 (describing human resource benefits of offering a one-way binding 
arbitration process for statutory discrimination claims and how the fairness of Coke’s dispute 
resolution program has led to positive perceptions of the employer by its employees and 
outsiders).  
 162. 525 U.S. 70, 74 (1998) (describing how the employee was told by the Union to file 
an ADA claim with the EEOC instead of a grievance). 
 163. 548 U.S. 53, 58 (2006) (referring to use of a grievance procedure to address initial 
suspension). The employee in White was covered by a collective bargaining agreement and 
represented by a union, the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, in a suspension 
hearing that could have resulted in “subsequent steps, including arbitration.” See Brief of the 
Am. Fed’n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. & the Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div., 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15, Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe R.R. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259). Although it was clear that the 
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have pursued the matter in arbitration instead of the employee pursuing the 
underlying discrimination claims through the courts. 
But this approach allows unions to sidestep the difficult challenges and ignore 
the intra-union issues when members are pitted against each other over a 
discrimination matter. This failure to address the underlying issues has only 
exacerbated the racial divide in unions.164 Although Professor Deborah Widiss 
suggests that opening up disputes through more Pyett-type agreements will present 
opportunities for many more conflicts that unions will have to navigate,165 this 
                                                                                                                 
employee in White had to file a grievance under the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement as required to protect her job when she was suspended and a union member 
represented her in that hearing about the suspension, the case does not reflect any union 
involvement in her underlying sexual harassment claim or subsequent retaliation claim other 
than the union’s brief filed in support with the Supreme Court. See id.; see also Brief for 
Respondent at 3, Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259) 
(describing union involvement in representing White in grievance about her suspension).  
 164. Crain & Matheny, supra note 72, at 1603–04 (describing the union’s failures in 
addressing sexual harassment in a particular case involving Mitsubishi and explaining how 
the union’s missteps created more discrimination problems by focusing on job security and 
ignoring the discrimination complaints); see also Jill Maxwell, Unifying Title VII and Labor 
Law to Expand Working Class Women’s Access to Non-Traditional Occupations, 11 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 681, 693–705 (2010) (discussing the difficulties for employees in pursuing 
discrimination claims when a union fails to pursue those claims within its duty of fair 
representation). The circumstances in Ricci also highlight how a union’s poor choices in 
resolving a statutory discrimination claim that pits one member against another can 
exacerbate the racial divisions. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 165. Deborah Widiss, Divergent Interests: Union Representation of Individual 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 87 IND. L.J. 421, 429 (2012) (asserting that if Pyett 
were in place, the union in Ricci would have been forced to take sides). Professor Widiss 
asserts that the union in Ricci would have to take a position on the validity of the test in 
question if it agreed to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims. Id. However, that assertion 
is not completely true as evidenced by the procedures that William Gould has suggested, 
where the union makes sure that the employees have a fair process with legal representation, 
rather than taking a side in the dispute. See infra notes 232–40 and accompanying text; see 
also infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text (describing procedures suggested by Max 
Zimny that also protect employees as they pursue claims in arbitration while not forcing the 
union to pick sides). Pyett allows the union to take a more informed and collaborative role 
rather than trying to put its head in the metaphorical sand and ignore the divisiveness 
involving its members over race or even take sides with one of the groups in conflict with 
the other group. And, although union members could be the source of the discrimination, if a 
union does cavalierly undermine an employee’s case in support of the discrimination, the 
employee can pursue duty of fair representation claims. While it is imprudent to assume that 
union members will not discriminate against fellow members, as Professor Widiss suggests, 
this Article asserts that, in those instances where a union has a true conflict, the unions 
should actively seek to provide all of its members who are embroiled in the conflict with a 
fair arbitration process to resolve it. Then, rather than washing their hands of the dispute and 
praying that it can be resolved in the courts without any union involvement, the union can 
responsibly play a role. This Article also asserts that if the union chooses to not bring a claim 
of discrimination in arbitration, then the claimants should have the right to bring the claim, 
and the concerns that Professor Widiss has highlighted about union discriminatory abuse and 
conflicts will be ameliorated. See Widiss, supra, at 429 (asserting that unions will find that 
all the conflicts of interest will present a Pandora’s box that they will choose not to open). 
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Article asserts that it is better for a union to be proactive and seek ways that can 
provide a quick and fair opportunity for resolution rather than picking sides or 
ignoring the dispute. And if a union is truly presented with a conflict of interest, it 
should withdraw from the dispute while using its resources to make sure the 
members with competing interests can both fairly and quickly obtain a resolution. 
Obviously, a union can pick sides in the dispute if it clearly investigates the 
matter. However, that action seems counterproductive and an unwise choice when 
it involves assessing a complaint that pits one member against another, especially 
in a statutory discrimination matter.166 Another option would involve the union 
working with its members to find a fair solution for all involved, possibly through 
the union pursuing the matter through labor arbitration.167 
                                                                                                                 
Overall, I acknowledge the concerns that Professor Widiss raises regarding the challenges 
that unions face if they arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims and possible 
difficulties for employees if unions fail in managing this important responsibility. 
Nevertheless, I have focused my concerns on the interests of the racial minorities who are 
discriminated against in the workplace and have seen their unions search for every way to 
opt out of handling their statutory claims. 
 166. Unions clearly have to make choices on other issues that involve non-statutory 
matters and non-disciplinary grievances, such as promotion entitlements based on seniority, 
which, if successful, operate to the favor of one employee member and to the detriment of 
another employee member. See Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair 
Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127, 171–76 (1992) (describing three examples 
where a union had to decide on processing grievances pitting one member against another). 
Nevertheless, the union “must fairly represent both groups of employees and may take a 
position in favor of one group only on the basis of informed, reasoned judgment regarding 
the merits of the claims in terms of the language of the collective bargaining agreement.” 
Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1237 (8th Cir. 1980). This Article 
suggests that, when issues of statutory discrimination arise, the union should not even 
consider favoring one member versus another and should instead seek a fair process for the 
employees involved that provides all members effective vindication of statutory 
discrimination claims.  
 167. This is not a Pollyanna-ish comment as unions have a long history of neutrally 
resolving conflicts among union members by choosing not to pick sides and fairly 
representing all of the employees. See Barker & Haggard, supra note 157, at 143–45; Crain, 
supra note 94, at 58–59. But see Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation as 
Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1211, 1268 (1985) (asserting that an approach of asking 
the union to remain neutral when dealing with conflicting interests of employee members 
requires that the union abandon and “forsake its role as advocate for its bargaining unit”). 
Furthermore, there are examples of comprehensive attempts by employers to work with all 
of those involved to resolve workplace discrimination through offering arbitration as a fair 
process for employees. See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 161, at 78–80, 98–108 (describing 
how Coke developed its one-way binding arbitration program as a response to major race 
discrimination lawsuits and through the guidance of an outside taskforce of leading human 
resource experts); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and 
the Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 901–03 
tbl.31 & nn.234–35 (2004) (describing Shell’s Resolve program allowing mediation, then 
arbitration, and the opportunity to then go to court and obtain legal representation throughout 
as part of an overall CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution survey of how companies manage 
employment disputes). 
2012] RACIAL JUSTICE UNION ARBITRATION 399 
 
 
A prominent union attorney, Max Zimny, proposed several years ago that unions 
and employers develop a comprehensive arbitration procedure to address statutory 
discrimination claims.168 Zimny’s comprehensive procedure would allow an 
employee to make the decision to pursue a claim in arbitration after a dispute arose 
while still providing the employee with rights to discovery, the fair ability to select 
the arbitrators, the protection of statutes of limitation with respect to filed 
grievances, and the provision of legal counsel, either through the union or 
privately.169 The goal of such a procedure would be to provide a “plan by which 
statutory rights are preserved, the needs of all parties are considered, and the 
individual employee does not contend alone and unarmed with the mightier 
employer and union.”170 As a result, Zimny’s comprehensive procedure appears to 
join the interests of all the key stakeholders, similar to Bell’s interest convergence 
theory. 
However, if the effort to represent the interests of all the employees fails 
because of the difficult choices a union must make,171 then the union should 
support all of its members in seeking a resolution that allows effective vindication 
of all rights without picking sides and creating further divisiveness. That resolution 
may occur through various methods, including mediation, arbitration involving 
legal representation with or without the union’s involvement, or court resolution 
without union involvement.172 As we return to the Ricci173 and Pyett174 decisions, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. McEneaney, supra note 74, at 171 (citing Max Zimny, Arbitration of Statutory 
Employment Disputes Under Collective Bargaining Agreements, in PROCEEDINGS OF NYU 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 175, 178 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1996)) (describing 
assertions by union attorney, Max Zimny, that there should be a separate procedure from the 
labor arbitration process that now resembles employment arbitration under Gilmer when 
processing statutory discrimination claims); see also George Nicolau, Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and Implications for Employees, Employers 
and Practitioners, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 197 n.114 (1998) (describing Zimny’s 
proposal); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Assignment of Labor Arbitration, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
41, 74 (2007) (asserting that the union should be able to assign the right to arbitrate to an 
individual employee which will insure the employee has “his or her day in court” and this 
assignment also protects the union from duty of fair representation challenges). 
 169. McEneaney, supra note 74, at 171–72. 
 170. Id. at 171. 
 171. As Professor Ann Hodges has eloquently explained, it is not an easy decision for a 
union to agree to handle a discrimination matter in the grievance process when a union 
cannot pursue every claim through final and binding arbitration:  
A decision not to arbitrate a discrimination claim has political implications for 
the union officers, who may be accused by the members of discrimination. 
Member dissatisfaction may lead to political defeat of the officers or even 
decertification of the union. Furthermore, the union may be sued for breach of 
the duty of fair representation or charged with violating discrimination laws for 
failing to arbitrate a discrimination grievance. 
Hodges, supra note 66, at 163–64 (internal citation omitted). 
 172. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 56, 56–58 (arguing that parties to an arbitration agreement should design the arbitration 
process as part and parcel of an overall conflict management process that includes 
negotiation, mediation, and specific procedures designed to effectuate the choices of the 
parties that would not be possible in the court system). 
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we can learn something from how the unions involved in those disputes decided to 
address internal conflicts over the handling of statutory discrimination claims. 
1. Union in Ricci Picks Sides in the Dispute and Sues to Support One Group of Its 
Members Against Another Group 
All the New Haven firefighters involved in the Ricci dispute were represented 
by New Haven Firefighters Local 825 of the International Association of 
Firefighters Union (“Local 825”).175 In the dispute about certifying exams for 
promotions, which placed black firefighters against mostly white firefighters and 
eventually led to the Supreme Court decision, Local 825 chose to support the Ricci 
plaintiffs (in other words, the mostly white firefighters) openly and publicly.176 
Further, only six days after the Ricci plaintiffs had filed their own lawsuit against 
the City of New Haven, Local 825 filed a separate lawsuit against the City of New 
Haven Civil Service Commission that was removed to federal court on July 15, 
2004.177 Local 825’s lawsuit sought to get the exam results at issue in the Ricci case 
certified by the New Haven Civil Service Commission.178 Local 825 voted to 
pursue this action despite objections by African American members of Local 
825.179 Some of the African American members considered filing state agency 
complaints against the union while also trying to withdraw from the union because 
Local 825, by deciding to take legal action to certify the exam results, was taking 
their dues for membership but not pursuing their interests.180  
It is unclear why Local 825 filed a lawsuit supporting the interests of the mostly 
white members who wanted the exam results certified while going against the 
interests of its African American members who were concerned about indicators of 
an illegal discriminatory impact from the exam results.181 Perhaps, the leadership of 
Local 825 did not care about the objections of its African American members and 
just focused on what the majority of its leadership decided. What is surprising is 
that Local 825 did not see how its role of representing all the firefighters’ interests 
would be compromised by taking sides. Regardless, in dismissing Local 825’s 
lawsuit against the City of New Haven Civil Service Commission, federal judge 
Mark R. Kravitz found that “it is clear from the face of the Union’s complaint that 
there is a deep and divisive conflict between the interests of its members.”182 Judge 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 174. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 175. See New Haven Firefighters Local 825 v. City of New Haven, No. 
Civ.3:04CV1169(MRK), 2005 WL 3531465, at *2 n.2 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2005). 
 176. See William Kaempffer, Race Divides Fire Test Issue, NEW HAVEN REG. (May 11, 
2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2004/05/11/import/11622902.txt (discussing the 
eight to three vote by the fire union board to pursue legal remedy to certify test results at 
issue in the Ricci case). 
 177. See New Haven Firefighters Local 825, 2005 WL 3531465, at *1. 
 178. Id. 
 179. William Kaempffer, Minority Firefighters Set to Sue Union, NEW HAVEN REG. (May 
28, 2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2004/05/28/import/11814108.txt. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See New Haven Firefighters Local 825, 2005 WL 3531465. 
 182. Id. at *1–3. 
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Kravitz also explained some of the parameters of this divisiveness: “A potential 
conflict also exists between minority applicants—against whom there was a fear of 
adverse impact that prompted Defendants not to certify the results—and non-
minority applicants who claim to have been discriminated against.”183  
In reviewing the actions of Local 825, it appears evident that, despite knowing 
the existence of this divisive conflict, Local 825 picked sides and supported the 
Ricci plaintiffs by filing its own lawsuit and thereby unnecessarily antagonizing its 
African American members. The court reached a pragmatic resolution based upon 
concerns about the conflicts of interest presented that Local 825 should have 
recognized in the first instance. Specifically, the court dismissed Local 825’s 
lawsuit and found that “the interests of a significant subset of the Union’s members 
are diametrically opposed to the interests of another significant subset—precisely 
the sort of conflict that makes individual participation by aggrieved members 
necessary.”184  
Moreover, Local 825 used its membership-driven finances to file a suit even 
when “the Union’s counsel could provide the Court with no reason that Ricci [—a 
case brought primarily by the white firefighters—], which has progressed to a 
nearly identical stage of litigation, would not be a better vehicle for resolution of 
these issues.”185 The court essentially focused on “[p]rudential reasons” as to why it 
should dismiss Local 825’s lawsuit and allow these matters to be addressed within 
the Ricci lawsuit.186 The Ricci lawsuit focused on the claims of individual union 
members who had allegedly been harmed. Whereas, the “representative action” 
brought by the union involved issues for which the union obviously had a 
“substantial conflict of interest.”187 
2. Union in Pyett Chooses to Support All Members in Seeking a Court Resolution 
Due to Conflict in Pursuing Arbitration 
In contrast to the actions of Local 825 in Ricci, another union involved in a 
major discrimination dispute where potential conflicts of interest arose acted quite 
differently. With respect to the Pyett dispute, as mentioned, all the workers were 
represented by SEIU Local 32BJ. Some outsiders, at first view, may question why 
SEIU Local 32BJ would agree to terms as specific as those in the Pyett agreement 
that could be read as effectuating a clear and unmistakable waiver of the 
employees’ right to pursue their discrimination claims in court.188 However, there 
was a long history of good-faith bargaining between SEIU Local 32BJ on behalf of 
its members and with the employer association, the Realty Advisory Board.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. Id. at *2. 
 184. Id. at *3. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes 
Arbitration of Unionized Employees’ Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 861, 880–82 (2010) (discussing the assertion that a union is “selling out” and 
rebuking those claims when the union agrees to waive its employees’ right to pursue 
statutory discrimination claims in court). 
402 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:367 
 
 
This history of bargaining included well-defined provisions supporting a broad 
resolution of disputes through the arbitration process. Article VI of their agreement 
provides for “a Contract Arbitrator to decide all differences arising between the 
parties as to interpretation, application or performance of any part of th[e] 
Agreement and such other issues as the parties are expressly required to arbitrate 
before him under the terms of this Agreement.”189 Section 30 of Article XIV of 
their agreement also provides that “[t]here shall be no discrimination against any 
present or future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age, disability, national 
origin, sex, union membership, or any characteristic protected by law.”190 Section 
30 also adds that discrimination claims, “including . . . claims made pursuant to . . . 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, . . . or any other similar laws . . . shall 
be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure (Articles V and VI) as the sole 
and exclusive remedy for violations.”191 “Section 30 concludes by directing that 
‘[a]rbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims 
of discrimination.’”192  
The standard no-discrimination clause in the SEIU Local 32BJ/Realty Advisory 
Board collective bargaining agreement in Pyett was previously amended in 1999 to 
take account of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wright, which suggested that the 
parties could waive the employees’ right to pursue the claim in court if the waiver 
was clear and unmistakable.193 Specifically, the parties’ agreed provision vested the 
contract arbitrators with the authority to decide discrimination claims and allowed 
SEIU Local 32BJ to seek full relief for any discrimination claims that SEIU Local 
32BJ may bring to arbitration. Also, due to the provision in the arbitration clause 
making “the award of the Arbitrator . . . final and binding upon the parties and the 
employee(s) involved,” the employer was ensured, to the extent allowed by law, 
that any statutory discrimination claim pursued by SEIU Local 32BJ and decided 
by a Contractor Arbitrator could not be litigated again in court by SEIU Local 32BJ 
or by the employee-grievant.194  
What is clear from the appendix to the SEIU Local 32BJ Supreme Court brief 
filed in support of the employees in Pyett is that SEIU Local 32BJ agreed to these 
specific terms as a waiver so that it could help process discrimination claims for 
full relief of its members when possible. Obviously, SEIU Local 32BJ never 
thought that an employee could be compelled to arbitrate when SEIU Local 32BJ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 189. Brief of the Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 32BJ as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 6–7, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (No. 07-581) 
(alteration in original) (quoting language from the CBA in Petitioner’s Appendix at 43a). 
 190. Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Petitioner’s Appendix at 48a).  
 191. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Petitioner’s Appendix at 48a). 
 192. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Petitioner’s Appendix at 
48a). 
 193. Id. at 13. 
 194. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Petitioner’s Appendix at 45a). This goal of 
avoiding litigation in multiple forums regarding the same underlying disputes appears to be a 
prime value for the employer in negotiating Pyett agreements, especially if it may avoid 
unpredictable juries. Id. 
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chose not to pursue the case in arbitration. And the subsequent lower court 
decisions in Morris195 and Kravar196 support this belief.197  
What SEIU Local 32BJ seemed to gain in exchange for these terms was an 
agreement by the employer to provide fairer arbitration procedures for its diverse 
membership regarding the selection of arbitrators to hear these statutory 
discrimination claims:  
This agreement was based on our joint commitment to diversify the 
panel of arbitrators to better reflect the Union’s membership, to develop 
procedures appropriate for such cases, and to evaluate our experience in 
connection with these claims at the conclusion of this agreement and in 
light of any subsequent court decisions.198  
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. Morris v. Temco Serv. Indus., Inc., Case No. 09 Civ. 6194(WHP), 2010 WL 
3291810, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010). 
 196. Kravar v. Triangle Serv., Inc., Case No. 1:06-cv-07858(RJH), 2009 WL 1392595, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009). 
 197. Regardless, there is not a lot of optimism that the Supreme Court will agree with 
these findings that the employee can file in court if the union chooses not to pursue the claim 
in arbitration given the Pyett decision and questions raised during oral argument. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) 
(No. 07-581), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/07-581.pdf (identifying questions of Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Anthony Kennedy suggesting the view that after Pyett at bottom, the union’s failure to 
process a claim in arbitration would require the individual employee to arbitrate the claim, 
and at top, the union’s decision to not process the claim in arbitration functions as a screen of 
“frivolous claims” that should just be dismissed as otherwise an “employer hasn’t gotten 
very much”); see also Gregory & McNamara, supra note 160, at 453–54 (discussing the oral 
argument transcript in Pyett and referring to the “possibilities” of forcing a unionized 
employee into arbitration if the union refuses to arbitrate as “stunning” and “could utterly 
transform labor arbitration in deeply problematic ways”).  
 198. Brief of the Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 32BJ as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, supra note 189, at 4A app. B (quoting Letter from Michael P. Fishman, SEIU 
Local 32BJ, to James Berg, Realty Advisory Board (April 19, 2000)); see also Larry 
Engelstein & Andrew Strom, Now That the Court Has Spoken, What’s Next?, 5 N.Y.U. LAB. 
& EMP. L. NEWSL. Fall 2009, at 5, 5–6 (offering comments from SEIU Local 32BJ 
representatives asserting that its agreement with the Realty Advisory Board in Pyett does not 
act as a clear and unmistakable waiver, that court decisions since Pyett show that employees 
may still go to court if the union does not pursue the case in arbitration, and identifying one 
benefit of pursuing discrimination claims in labor arbitration is that “low-wage workers often 
have trouble finding employment discrimination specialists who are willing to take their 
cases to court”). Since the Pyett decision, it appears the employer association in Pyett and 
SEIU Local 32BJ have agreed to a process that would allow the employee to take a dispute 
to arbitration independently if the SEIU Local 32BJ chose not to pursue the dispute in 
arbitration. See William B. Gould IV, A Half Century of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Fifty 
Years of Ironies Squared, in ARBITRATION 2010: THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY AT 50: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 35, 72 n.151 (Paul D. Staudohar & Mark I. Lurie eds., 2010) (describing 
Agreement and Protocol between SEIU 32BJ and the Realty Advisory Board entered into 
February 17, 2010). Pursuant to this subsequent agreement of the parties in Pyett, individual 
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As a result, SEIU Local 32BJ should be applauded for offering its members with 
race discrimination complaints an opportunity not usually provided in the court 
system—a forum where their complaints can be heard by a diverse decision 
maker199 while being provided legal representation200 and a much better chance of a 
favorable resolution.201 Accordingly, in an agreement like the one agreed to by 
SEIU Local 32BJ, the interests of employees in vindicating their race 
discrimination claims can converge with their union’s interest in fairly representing 
all their members’ workplace concerns and their employer’s interest in having a 
productive mechanism to resolve race discrimination complaints.  
                                                                                                                 
employees may pursue arbitration of statutory discrimination claims when the union chooses 
not to pursue the claims; Local 32BJ will not be a party to these arbitrations, the arbitrator 
may not award relief that would require amendment of the CBA, and any award made 
pursuant to this Protocol would not have any precedential value under the CBA. Id. 
 199. See generally Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the Racially Biased 
Selection of Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4. J. AM. ARB. 1 (2005) 
(describing benefits and fairness of arbitration system when employees of racial minorities 
know that there is a fair chance that their disputes may be decided by members of their own 
race); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 
38 GA. L. REV. 1145, 1215–16 (2004) (describing the benefits for minority employees in 
having minority arbitrators available to hear their disputes); E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not 
Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through 
Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 275 (1999) (describing the 
difficulties that cultural minorities face in a system where “the substantive merit of their 
legal claims is at risk of being subjugated to majoritarian values, through a process that relies 
on members of the majority culture to vindicate the substantive rights at issue”); E. Gary 
Spitko, Judge Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065, 
1067–69 (1999). But see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People 
Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 1002 
n.40, 1037, 1041 (1999) (recognizing some level of bias against minority cultures in the 
court system and legitimate distrust by minority cultures of judicial decision making while 
also suggesting these concern are somewhat “overstated” beliefs about bigotry in the court 
system). 
 200. Green, supra note 11, at 100–16 (describing the benefits of legal representation 
through union involvement as a major benefit for employees pursuing statutory 
discrimination claims and limited opportunities that employees have in obtaining legal 
representation in the courts). The value of legal representation is significant and influenced 
significantly by the wealth of the litigants. See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant 
Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649 (2010); see also infra text accompanying note 216. 
Accordingly, “low-wage employees whose cases involve relatively small sums of money 
will nevertheless have legal counsel available” to them in pursuing their claims through 
union arbitration. Wheeler, supra note 160, at 27–28 & n.6. 
 201. Wheeler, supra note 160, at 27–28 & n.6 (describing how employees win only about 
12% of “discrimination cases in Federal courts” and asserting that opportunities for legal and 
union representation coordinated by the union as in the Pyett case would provide “a powerful 
form of conflict insurance for employees”).  
2012] RACIAL JUSTICE UNION ARBITRATION 405 
 
 
IV. WHY ARBITRATION OFFERS A VIABLE OPTION FOR RACE CLAIMS IF UNIONS 
TAKE THE LEAD 
Organized labor, mostly through its black leadership, has played a significant 
role in addressing race discrimination in America.202 Unfortunately, a great deal of 
organized labor’s history does not represent a positive civil rights record. In the 
early part of the twentieth century many unions practiced overt racism.203 Despite 
the fact that unions continue to decrease in numbers, the ones that still have a key 
presence can take a more active role in addressing current racial discrimination 
matters as black workers are currently “more likely to be union workers” than their 
“white, Asian, or Hispanic” coworkers.204  
Unfortunately, class conflicts have exacerbated the issue and divided organized 
labor’s focus as white male leadership has concentrated on class justice, and black 
and other identity groups within the unions have emphasized racial justice.205 In 
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. See E.J. Dionne Jr., Why Labor Matters; A Movement Expanded Rights and 
Prosperity, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2010, at A15 (describing the role of the United Auto 
Workers Union in the 1963 landmark civil rights march on Washington held in August 
1963).  
 203. See Steven H. Kropp, Deconstructing Racism in American Society—The Role Labor 
Law Might Have Played (But Did Not) in Ending Race Discrimination: A Partial 
Explanation and Historical Commentary, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 380, 384, 389 
(2002); Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: Four 
Dimensions of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 162 & 
nn.167–68 (2001) (“Up until the New Deal, and in some cases even after, unions widely 
practiced overt exclusion of minorities, women and immigrants” and before then “almost all 
labor unions engaged in race discrimination, ranging from complete exclusion to internal 
segregation.”); see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color 
at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395, 404 
(1993) (explaining the lack of fair representation for black employees working for the 
railroads prior to Steele v. Louisville Nashville Railroad); Michael Jordan, The NLRB Racial 
Discrimination Decisions, 1935–1964: The Empiric Process of Administration and the Inner 
Eye of Racism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 55, 58–63 (1991) (describing the pervasive level of 
discrimination against blacks within unions from 1935–1964); accord Molly S. McUsic & 
Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
1339, 1346 (1997). 
 204. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Stats., Union Members—2010 (Jan. 12, 2011), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (describing how union density 
for 2010 dropped to 11.9% and identifying ongoing black worker commitment to unions). 
Union density for 2009 was at 12.3% and it has been declining rapidly since the 1950s when 
it approached an all-time high of nearly one-third of the workforce. See Dionne, supra note 
202, at A15 (“Only 12.3 percent of American wage and salary workers belong to unions, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, down from a peak of about one-third of the work 
force in 1955. A movement historically associated with the brawny workers in auto, steel, 
rubber, construction, rail and the ports now represents more employees in the public sector 
(7.9 million) than in the private sector (7.4 million).”); see also Marion Crain & Ken 
Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767, 1767–68 (2001) (“Labor union 
density has been declining since the 1950s.”).  
 205. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 204, at 1785–88 (describing the race and class 
conflict and how the historical problems and conflicts with unions and civil rights groups 
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referring to the solidarity efforts of three national unions, the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW), the SEIU, and her own union, Hotel Employees & 
Restaurant Employees Union (HERE), María Elena Durazo, the first Latina to head 
a major local union in Southern California, commented in 2006 that workers 
“should not be pitted against each other due to nationality, ethnicity, or race.”206 
Instead, unions should capitalize on the increasing diversity in union membership 
rosters by providing a response to rectify organized labor’s poor history of race 
relations. Accordingly, the opportunity to help its black members pursue race 
discrimination claims would likely go a long way toward bridging the racial gap 
that unions must address. 
On June 2, 2004, at a meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), 
former NAA president and former dean of the University of Michigan Law School, 
Theodore St. Antoine, asked a group of panelists why the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wright207 should not be considered an opportunity for employers and 
unions to agree to waive employees’ rights to pursue discrimination claims in 
courts.208 St. Antoine wondered whether a union could be persuaded to waive those 
rights if the union could be given something of value in return due to the high costs 
of handling a discrimination case.209 An attorney representing employers, Robert 
Vercruysse, responded to St. Antoine’s query by noting that he recommends to his 
clients that they not try to get waivers because court resolution allows a bad 
decision to be appealed.210 In response to St. Antoine’s inquiry, Marilyn 
Teitelbaum, an attorney who represents unions, asserted that she tells unions to not 
seek such waivers and instead to only negotiate a general antidiscrimination 
provision because such a provision gives the employee two bites of the apple.211  
St. Antoine’s suggestion of resolving statutory discrimination disputes through 
arbitration appeared interesting,212 especially as a viable option to the dismal results 
for plaintiffs in the courts.213 However, it also appeared anecdotally given the 
                                                                                                                 
raises a concern, and questioning the resolve of organized labor to have a social justice focus 
rather than a class focus given a recent effort by organized labor to “put aside race and 
gender interests”); Green, supra note 11, at 90. 
 206. See María Elena Durazo, Making Movement: Communities of Color and New 
Models of Organizing Labor, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 235, 241 (2006).  
 207. Wright v. Universal Maritime Servs. Inc., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
 208. Ken May, Arbitration: Panel Discusses Whether Unions Should Waive Employees’ 
Right to Sue for Bias, 105 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A6 (June 2, 2004). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. More than a decade ago, I also raised this pro-litigation stance as a reason why 
employers may consider not agreeing to arbitrate claims even with a predispute agreement. 
See Green, supra note 78.  
 211. May, supra note 208. 
 212. It was unclear at the time of St. Antoine’s query that an employer and union could 
even agree to a waiver as that question was not clearly addressed until the Court’s decision 
in Pyett on April 1, 2009. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 213. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 887 (2008) (describing difficulties for employees in 
discrimination cases and finding that “the body of doctrine [used by the courts to assess 
violations of the law under Title VII] places tough requirements on employees to quickly 
ascertain and challenge any discrimination they encounter in the workplace” and “leaves 
very little allowance for difficulties perceiving and recognizing discrimination, hesitation in 
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responses from an attorney representing employers and an attorney representing 
unions that neither employers nor unions wanted anything to do with agreeing to 
take on statutory discrimination matters through the collective bargaining 
agreement arbitration process.214 
However, in reviewing a dispute like Ricci where the union decided that it had 
to pick sides in a racial dispute involving two groups of its firefighter members, 
does arbitration offer a better solution than the litigation option attempted? Also, 
does Pyett suggest a process where employers and unions could develop tools to 
resolve these racially charged and divisive employment disputes? Would this 
process put the employer and the union in a fair and possibly neutral framework 
that focuses on delivering an outcome that seeks racial justice for all employees? 
These questions could be addressed by bargaining a fair arbitral forum.215 The 
                                                                                                                 
reporting and challenging it, and delay for the sake of pursuing other avenues first”); Wendy 
Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
889, 916 (2006) (asserting that only 27% of plaintiffs prevail in race and national origin 
discrimination cases); Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 28 (describing difficulties in proving 
and establishing employment discrimination under current statutory laws); Michael Selmi, 
Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560–61 
(2001) (describing how difficult it is for employees pursuing discrimination as employers 
prevail in 98% of federal court employment discrimination cases resolved and discussing 
how these cases tend to be resolved at the pre-trial stage in favor of employers). Another 
study of racial harassment also found that plaintiffs bringing these kinds of workplace 
discrimination cases tended to be black and their alleged harassers tended to be white, but 
plaintiffs succeeded in successfully bringing these cases only 21.5% of the time. See Pat K. 
Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 49, 54, 96–109 (2006). 
 214. May, supra note 208. But see Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti-Union Federal 
Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 499–500 (2001) (asserting that unions 
will benefit by having employees represent employees in arbitration of statutory 
discrimination claims). More recent assessments suggest that employers and unions may still 
not want anything to do with negotiating these waivers. Coleman, supra note 91, at 233–36 
(assessing the costs of litigation as compared to arbitration which were provided to the 
author by an anonymous employer, and asserting that litigation may be cheaper than 
arbitration). However, a few of the academic commentators remain optimistic about the 
value of arbitrating employment discrimination matters. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 188, at 
861, 864 (contending that after Pyett, litigants will likely “achieve better results in labor 
arbitration than in traditional litigation” (emphasis omitted) and “Pyett creates an 
opportunity for unionized employees and their advocates to take advantage of the arbitration 
process to resolve their discrimination claims more quickly and cheaply with results similar 
to or better than litigation”); Ann C. Hodges, Fallout from 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Fractured 
Arbitration Systems in the Unionized Workplace, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 19, 44–45 (suggesting 
opportunities for parties to address discrimination claims in union setting after Pyett if 
parties negotiate procedures to handle legal claims). But see Stephen Plass, Private Dispute 
Resolution and the Future of Institutional Workplace Discrimination, 54 HOW. L.J. 45, 80–
81 (2010) (asserting that arbitration, due to its private nature and inability to invoke public 
scrutiny of employers, will have little impact in addressing workplace discrimination 
because only a few cases result in great public scrutiny). 
 215. See Schohn, supra note 160, at 331–32 (suggesting the negotiation of fair 
procedures that would address concerns about arbitrating statutory discrimination claims in 
the union setting). A union attorney, Mary K. O’Melveny, has asserted: “Even if unions 
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bargain must recognize the unique issues that informal processes may create for 
participants of color who bring race discrimination claims in arbitration. This 
bargain must also find a balance between extremist216 views that are pro-arbitration 
versus anti-arbitration regarding resolution of statutory discrimination claims.217  
A. Bargaining over a Fair Arbitral Forum for All Employees 
Most behavioral research indicates that employees prefer a dispute resolution 
process that offers fair procedures.218 Whether that process must be adjudicative 
(similar to the process that occurs in courts and arbitration), or not (similar to the 
process that occurs in mediation or negotiation), is unclear.219 Because Pyett 
changes the landscape for offering labor arbitration to employees as a dispute 
resolution process when it involves a statutory discrimination claim, the 
opportunity to negotiate a fair arbitration forum provides new hope for racial 
justice in the workplace.220 Although Pyett makes it clear that employers and 
unions can bargain about these matters, whether an employer or union will seek to 
negotiate these waivers is a separate question.221  
                                                                                                                 
could appropriately negotiate waivers, they would certainly have to bargain for an entirely 
separate dispute resolution process that would provide full statutory remedies and 
meaningful guarantees of procedural fairness sufficient to satisfy the minimum standards 
suggested in Gilmer.” O’Melveny, supra note 86, at 213. 
 216. I use the term “extremist” only to point out that there are those who appear 
extremely skeptical of arbitration for employees and those who are extremely passionate 
about its use for employees. Professor Mark Weidemaier refers to these groups as “[s]keptics 
and champions.” W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 
ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 69 (2007). 
 217. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 
from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 591 (2009) (describing legislative efforts to ban arbitration of employment 
discrimination disputes and seeking a balance to that approach by offering exemptions for 
high-level employees and small employers). 
 218. See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 10, at 69 (discussing concept of procedural 
justice and how people have “preferences for procedures that allow them (as opposed to third 
parties) to control the development and selection of information that will be used to resolve 
the dispute”). 
 219. Id. at 91–106 (finding from a review of empirical data that disputants’ desire to have 
more control over dispute process varies by age and to the extent that older disputants prefer 
control before the dispute arises, the lack of control plays less of a role in final satisfaction 
with the process after a result has occurred whether through adjudication or non-adjudicative 
processes). 
 220. But see Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Schizophrenic Nature of Labor Arbitration, 
2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 57, 69–79 (suggesting that the influx of law and employment 
discrimination into labor arbitration has been occurring for many years due to public policy 
arguments, the expansion of arbitration of statutory claims under the FAA, and overlapping 
rights under the Family and Medical Leave laws). 
 221. See Dennis R. Nolan, Disputatio: “Creeping Legalism” as a Declension Myth, 2010 
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 15–16 (asserting that very few employers and unions will enter into Pyett 
clear and unmistakable waiver agreements and therefore the Pyett decision will have little 
impact on labor arbitration); Wheeler, supra note 160, at 27 (“It is this writer’s view that, on 
balance, it is unlikely that such [Pyett] clauses will be widely adopted, in spite of their 
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The Court in Pyett stated in dicta222 that waiving employee rights to pursue 
statutory claims in court through an agreement to arbitrate involves a condition of 
employment, one of the terms that is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the 
NLRA.223 If this is a mandatory subject, how persistent the parties may be in trying 
to seek a waiver while still meeting their obligations under the NLRA to bargain in 
good faith would primarily involve concerns about the employer causing a 
bargaining impasse by insisting upon a statutory arbitration provision.224 On the 
other hand, if the employer and union could bargain about the subject but neither 
could be compelled to the point of reaching a bargaining impasse, the issue would 
normally be a permissive subject of bargaining under labor law and attempting to 
bargain to an impasse would be bad faith.225 Accordingly, this distinction between a 
                                                                                                                 
advantages.”). One issue that must also be addressed if unions and employers seek to merge 
labor arbitration and employment arbitration involves the duty to bargain under labor law. If 
a union and an employer could not agree about waiving the statutory right to pursue a claim 
in court, then some authority exists to support the claim that the employer could unilaterally 
bargain with individual union workers about agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims. See Air 
Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This authority is 
somewhat limited and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the federal agency 
charged with enforcing the NLRA, has not established a clear position on this issue. See 
ARTHUR F. ROSENFELD, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM GC 05-03, at 8 
(2005) (discussing Air Line Pilots case and stating “the waiver of an employee’s right to 
bring statutory claims to a judicial forum is not itself a mandatory subject of bargaining”); 
see also RICHARD A. SIEGEL, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 10-
13(CH) 1 (2009) (recognizing the existence of the Pyett decision but only with respect to the 
NLRB’s policy on deferral regarding an arbitration decision). The NLRB has, however, 
noted that the grievance and arbitration process is a mandatory subject of bargaining and it 
cannot be unilaterally implemented by the employer. See Util. Vault Co., 345 N.L.R.B. 79, 
83 n.2 (2005). Most recently in late 2009, the NLRB published a new operations 
memorandum by its general counsel, which advised that “a new approach to cases involving 
arbitral deference” might be necessary in light of the Pyett decision. See Michael C. Harper, 
A New Board Policy on Deferral to Arbitration: Acknowledging and Delimiting Union 
Waiver of Employee Statutory Rights, 5 FIU L. REV. 685, 685–86 (2010) (describing the 
operations memorandum and suggesting the NLRB adopt a new approach when deferring to 
an arbitration decision regarding rights covered under the NLRA). For now, if there are 
questions as to whether the NLRB should defer to an arbitration decision in light of Pyett, 
those questions should be directed to the NLRB’s Division of Advice for input. Id. 
 222. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1459, 1464 (2009) (suggesting that the 
waiver involving an agreement to arbitrate employment discrimination claims “easily 
qualifies as a ‘conditio[n] of employment’” that is a mandatory subject of bargaining 
(alteration in original)). However, there was no dispute in Pyett about whether the parties 
had voluntarily agreed to the terms and no need to determine whether the waiver involved a 
mandatory subject of bargaining despite the Court’s statement in Pyett that it involved a 
mandatory subject. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1463–64 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d)). But see Samuel Estreicher & 
Elena J. Voss, ‘Pyett’ Clears the Way for Agreements to Arbitrate Employee Statutory 
Claims, N.Y. L.J., May 22, 2009, at 4, 7 (asserting that Pyett “seemingly answered” the 
question of whether collective bargaining agreement waivers of statutory discrimination 
claims would constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining). 
 224. Estreicher & Voss, supra note 223, at 7. 
 225. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1958) 
(describing how the employer and the union are obligated to bargain in good faith regarding 
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permissive versus a mandatory subject of bargaining could present major 
implications.226  
As a mandatory subject of bargaining, the compulsion of such an agreement by 
the employer could occur theoretically even if the union does not agree. Upon 
bargaining to an impasse on this issue, labor law generally allows the employer to 
implement the last offer on the table.227 However, it would appear peculiar to allow 
an employer to insist upon a court waiver to the point of causing a bargaining 
impasse and implement the waiver as a final offer because it involves matters that 
are solely within the control of the union in exercising its discretion to process 
grievances to arbitration.228 Furthermore, if an agreement to waive has occurred 
through implementing the employer’s last offer without the union agreeing to it as 
part of an impasse, binding individual employees to pursuing statutory claims 
through labor arbitration would appear inconsistent with a clear and unmistakable 
action by the union.229  
Even if such waivers were found to be mandatory subjects of bargaining, this 
Article asserts that in order to be enforced, a clear and unmistakable waiver must 
include some affirmative agreement by the union and the employer to provide the 
employee with representation through arbitration as final resolution.230 Such 
waivers would also prohibit the union and employer from settling the statutory 
grievance without approval from the individual employee.231 Also, the employee 
                                                                                                                 
statutorily-defined mandatory subjects of bargaining which include wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment but only those subjects and they do not have to yield 
with respect to bargaining). 
 226. See generally Ann C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized 
Workplace: Is Bargaining with the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 513 
(2001). 
 227. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 n.12 (1962); see also Sposito, supra note 64, 
at 177 n.31 (noting that an employer is free to unilaterally implement the changes in the 
terms and working conditions embodied in its final proposal after reaching a bargaining 
impasse). 
 228. Although outside the scope of this Article, my hope is that such waivers, while 
representing mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA, could not be unilaterally 
implemented by the employer as that would frustrate the purposes of bargaining and usurp 
the union’s role by obligating it to represent employees in disputes that the union had not 
actually agreed to represent the employees. See McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 
F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that the NLRB recognizes certain exceptions to its 
rule that an employer may implement its final offer after reaching a good-faith impasse); see 
also Estreicher & Voss, supra note 223, at 7 (discussing McClatchy case). 
 229. See Sposito, supra note 64, at 188–89 (suggesting how imposition of an arbitration 
clause pursuant to a bargaining impasse would not be a “knowing and voluntary” waiver by 
the union or its members as the terms would not be “freely negotiated” nor involve terms 
“agreed to in exchange for other terms and conditions of employment”). 
 230. See Kim, supra note 74, at 247–54 (arguing for a two-tier system of handling 
grievances through labor arbitration where statutory discrimination claims provide for the 
grievant to decide whether the claim will go forward and employees are allowed procedural 
rights, legal representation, and remedies to effectively vindicate statutory claims through 
labor arbitration). 
 231. See William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins? The Federal Arbitration Act and 
Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 627–28 (2006) (describing how the use of an 
attorney for the grievant and allowing the grievant to play an active role in the processing of 
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must still be allowed to pursue his or her own claim in court or in arbitration if the 
union chooses not to pursue it within the scope of its duty of fair representation. 
Finally, the waiver must insure the employee will be able to effectively vindicate 
the statutory claim through the arbitration process or have a court option if the 
arbitration process cannot effectively vindicate the claim. 
Unlike what happened in Wright and Pyett, the Court should identify the key 
elements that must be present for a clear and unmistakable waiver of employees’ 
rights to pursue future statutory discrimination claims. There are some statutory 
rights, including the right to strike232 and the right of union officers to not be treated 
differently under labor law,233 wherein a union may effectuate a clear and 
unmistakable waiver as part of the collective bargaining process. However, waiving 
individual statutory rights to pursue a discrimination claim in court due to terms of 
a labor agreement’s arbitration process should require even more particulars to 
address the union’s ability to apply its discretion and not pursue the claim through 
arbitration. Only those agreements that provide an actual and fair forum for the 
employee to hear and vindicate her statutory claim would be required, regardless of 
whether the union decides to process the claim or not.234  
William Gould has suggested a process where employees and unions could 
resolve their statutory discrimination claims in arbitration.235 Gould, the second 
black arbitrator to ever join the NAA when he became a member in 1970,236 has 
described the procedures in two arbitration cases where the parties agreed to 
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims before the Supreme Court’s Gardner-
Denver decision in 1974.237 Specifically, the unions in each case represented the 
employee through the contractual issues, but the employee was also represented by 
chosen outside counsel to handle the statutory discrimination claims.238 The 
arbitrator was given the same authority as a federal judge.239  
Rather than focus on the language of the agreement as to whether it effectuates a 
clear and unmistakable waiver, Gould has asserted that the focus on fairness should 
shift to looking at the expertise of the arbitrators selected to handle the statutory 
                                                                                                                 
the statutory-related grievance is helpful). 
 232. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956) (discussing statutory 
right to strike and how any waiver must clearly address this type of right). 
 233. See Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705–08 (1983) (discussing the 
authority of the union to secure the goods and benefits of the entire bargaining unit within a 
collective bargaining agreement by waiving the statutory rights of its officials to protection 
from differential treatment). 
 234. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 796–810 (2008) (arguing that a focus on fairness measures in 
arbitration of employment claims would create a good balance to the critics both for and 
against it). 
 235. Gould, supra note 231, at 624–56. 
 236. Id. at 624 n.59. Gould is also the former chairman of the NLRB and currently a 
professor at Stanford Law School. 
 237. Id. at 627 & nn.78–79 (citing Weyerhauser Co. v. Int’l Woodworkers of Am., 78 
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1109 (1982) (Gould, Arb.) and Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc. v. Gen. 
Teamsters, 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 620 (1975)). 
 238. Id. at 627–28. 
 239. Id. at 628. 
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discrimination dispute.240 Gould argues quite persuasively that the arbitration of 
statutory discrimination claims is warranted in labor arbitration because: (1) 
arbitrators may rely on public law in making their decisions; (2) the courts do not 
provide an accessible option due to the expense involved and the need for legal 
representation; and (3) the appointment process of conservative federal judges.241 
Nevertheless, the arbitration process must remain fair by incorporating a “vigilant” 
effort to make sure the arbitrators selected will have the expertise to address 
statutory discrimination claims along with a pool of racially diverse arbitrators.242 
These appear to be the very concerns that led SEIU Local 32BJ to negotiate the 
waiver that led to the litigation in Pyett.243 
B. Matters of Race Discrimination Can Be Fairly Addressed in Arbitration  
The concerns expressed earlier about informal dispute resolution having a 
deleterious effect on people of color who seek justice must be addressed in 
pursuing arbitration as a final resolution.244 Unfortunately, this concern mistakenly 
assumes that fairness will occur in the court system with its public and formal 
values for those claimants seeking to resolve employment discrimination disputes 
based on race.245 But that assumption proves all too wrong when most of the 
analysis of employment discrimination claims comes forward.246 That data usually 
shows that employees tend to lose in court 90% of the time.247 And even greater 
percentages of employees who pursue such claims in court lack legal 
representation.248  
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. Id. at 632–33. 
 241. Id. at 651. 
 242. Id. at 656–58 (describing the dearth of minority arbitrators and how this must be 
changed if arbitration is to provide a fair system for employees seeking vindication of their 
racial discrimination claims rather than equating a nearly all-white and male arbitration 
process with an all-white jury process and the perception of unfairness); see also Reginald 
Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost in the Arbitration 
Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 407–10, 419–20, 428–29 (1996) (criticizing the lack of 
diversity of arbitrator pools, the inability of individual discrimination claimants to have fair 
and mutual selection of the arbitrator for statutory claims because of employer domination of 
the arbitrator selection process and unchecked arbitrator bias). 
 243. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 244. See supra Part I.B. 
 245. See Parker, supra note 213, at 936–39 (describing how judges have adopted an anti-
race plaintiff ideology as explanation for why these plaintiffs tend to lose at the summary 
judgment phase of most race-based employment discrimination cases). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Selmi, supra note 213, at 560–61. 
 248. See generally Stephan Landsman, Nothing for Something? Denying Legal 
Assistance to Those Compelled to Participate in ADR Proceedings, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
273 (2010); Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381 (2010); see also Lisa B. Bingham, Kiwhan Kim & Susan Summers 
Raines, Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment Mediation at the USPS, 17 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 359 (2002). 
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So the formalities of the court system and judges that Delgado seemed to 
support as providing more fairness and less racial prejudice than the informalities 
of ADR,249 do not ring true under our current court system’s handling of racial 
discrimination claims.250 Given these concerns, we must explore whether “plaintiffs 
have a better venue option” when “[a]rbitration is a possibility.”251 With continued 
decisions by five to four majorities of the Supreme Court as in Ricci that send the 
message that certain claims of race discrimination don’t matter,252 almost any other 
system appears better than the courts.253 If the arbitration process seeks to provide 
levels of fairness and a racially diverse cadre of arbitrators to handle these claims, 
the system would offer more fairness than the courts.254 Employers and unions 
should look at developing an overall dispute system design that will provide for 
racial justice in the workplace through arbitration as consistent with Bell’s interest-
convergence thesis.255 
                                                                                                                 
 
 249. Delgado, supra note 51, at 1402–04. 
 250. Parker, supra note 213, at 939–40 (suggesting that we not completely “turn away 
from the courts altogether in efforts to redress racial and ethnic employment discrimination” 
because “courts offer plaintiffs the value of a public forum in which to tell their stories”; 
however, we must realize that “race and national origin . . . cases are proving almost 
impossible to win in federal court” as they “settle at lower rates than employment 
discrimination cases as a whole” and “are also treated worse than gender employment 
discrimination cases”).  
 251. Id. at 939 & n.227 (discussing the possibility that arbitration may be a better venue 
but only from “limited empirical work”). 
 252. Chemerinsky, supra note 17.  
 253. This is not to suggest that the courts should be completely abandoned; rather, 
meaningful access to the courts should also be a component of the dispute resolution design 
system. See Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1218–32 (2009) (asserting that system dispute resolution concerns 
should focus on power imbalances, agency costs, and especially barriers to court access as it 
relates to arbitration).  
 254. Gould, supra note 231, at 627–28 (describing two labor arbitrations involving racial 
discrimination where the grievant was provided separate representation and the arbitrator 
was given the same authority as a federal judge); Alleyne, supra note 242, at 407–10, 419–
20, 428–29. Also, any concerns regarding institutional or repeat player arbitrator bias should 
be addressed. See Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded 
Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 416–27 (2010) (describing concerns of an “embedded” 
neutral in arbitration and possible issues of bias). 
 255. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Denise A. Walker & Won-Tae 
Chung, Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at 
the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (2009) (describing comprehensive design 
systems for arbitration of workplace disputes). Clearly, the concern would be that the union 
and the employer must choose a system that values democratic values in the workplace 
including “[s]uch notions [as] fundamental values of political participation, legal and social 
capital, accountability, rationality, personal autonomy, and equality, which must be weighed 
against substantive expertise, informality, speed, and finality in the context of binding 
arbitration.” Id. at 10. Given that this involves a union-negotiated system of fair dispute 
resolution, notions of “workplace democracy” should be of paramount concern and likely a 
normally understood component. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute 
Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 52, 67–
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C. Balancing the Concerns of the Arbitration Extremists 
When assessing the value of arbitration in resolving employment discrimination 
matters, most of the debate over the last twenty years has focused on the nature of 
waiving court resolution of statutory discrimination claims when employers use 
their bargaining power to make individual employees agree to the waiver as a 
condition of employment.256 As this debate has transpired, two extremist views 
have evolved. One view seems to look beyond just a romanticist notion of litigation 
and attacks every aspect of arbitration as being a nonstarter for resolving 
employment discrimination claims. One group, Public Citizen, a consumer rights-
based organization, has taken this approach.257 There are academic commentators 
who also tend to have this view.258 Under this view, these commentators appear to 
see no possible scenario where arbitration could be a viable alternative for an 
employee seeking vindication pursuant to a statutory discrimination claim.259  
To the opposite extremist view, some have taken the position that no real 
concern exists when an agreement to arbitrate between an employer and an 
individual employee was agreed to by the employee as a condition of employment 
without certain fairness issues being addressed because it is better for employees.260 
One group that focuses on representing the interests of the business community, the 
Chamber of Commerce, seems to have taken this approach.261 And there are 
academic commentators who appear to give great deference to the parties’ 
purported agreement to arbitrate and short shrift to fairness challenges.262 To 
                                                                                                                 
68 (2005). 
 256. See Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute 
Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58, 59–60 & n.8 
(2007). 
 257. See Employment Arbitration, FAIRARBITRATIONNOW.ORG, http://www.fair 
arbitrationnow.org/content/employment-arbitration (a Public Citizen-maintained website 
collecting stories and other items critical of arbitration imposed as a condition of 
employment); PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES 
ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
ArbitrationTrap.pdf. 
 258. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1247 (2009) (attacking essentially all arguments raised that may make arbitration 
more palatable as non-responsive to broader concerns about fairness for employees subjected 
to agreements to arbitrate). 
 259. Id. at 1335–41. 
 260. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 
(2001). 
 261. See Arbitration/ADR, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM (2010), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilr_issues/29/item/ADR.html (the Institute 
for Legal Reform is an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that collects information 
supporting the use of arbitration).  
 262. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 272–74 (2008) (asserting that 
there are several items such as retirement-plan options and choice of insurance carriers that 
are imposed by employers and arbitration is just another such item); see also Thomas E. 
Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 
18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233, 253, 261–62 (2007) (attacking efforts in Congress to address 
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achieve interest-convergence, the reality should find some compromise somewhere 
in the middle.263 Essentially, a fair arbitration process collectively bargained for 
and negotiated by employers and representative unions where employees have 
effective voice is what workers want anyway.264 
These extremist views have dovetailed into a debate about pending legislation in 
front of Congress, the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA).265 The AFA would make all 
predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims 
unenforceable, and the most recent version of the pending legislation would make 
enforcement of agreements by unions and employers to arbitrate statutory claims 
under Pyett unenforceable.266 Congress has already passed legislation, the Franken 
                                                                                                                 
fairness concerns for employees and consumers). To the extent that empirical studies have 
been able to address arbitration fairness, some of the results support the claims of fairness in 
mandatory arbitration. See David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing 
the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1557, 1578 (2005) (asserting that empirical studies of arbitration suggest that pro se 
employees will fare better in arbitration and most empirical data is insufficient to address 
broader questions of fairness in arbitration). 
 263. See Spitko, supra note 217; see also Malveaux, supra note 161 (discussing Coke’s 
process that provides for arbitration and it is only binding on the company); St. Antoine, 
supra note 234 (arguing for due process concerns to help protect employee fairness in 
arbitration). 
 264. See generally WHAT WORKERS SAY: EMPLOYEE VOICE IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
WORKPLACE 2–3, 23–24 (Richard B. Freeman, Peter Boxall & Peter Haynes eds., 2007) 
(finding from a survey of workers that they want more traditional-based union 
representation, they embrace employer-sponsored programs if they have a voice in issues 
that occur in the workplace); RICHARD B. FREEMAN, ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 
182: DO WORKERS STILL WANT UNIONS? MORE THAN EVER 2 (2007), available at 
http:\\www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bp182.pdf (finding that workers today want greater 
say at their workplace as much or more than in the 1990s); see also JULIUS G. GETMAN, 
RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT 284–85, 363 (2010) (describing 
the benefits of final and binding labor arbitration as achieving the goals of employers and 
unions in reaching compromises the parties desire and would have negotiated if they had an 
opportunity to bargain the resolution and also explaining how the process of selecting labor 
arbitrators motivates them to be fair in deciding disputes because of the ongoing desire to 
“maintain acceptability” to both sides for future selection). 
 265. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by 
Senators Al Franken (D.-Minn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D.-Colo.)); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011) (Congressman, Hank Johnson (D.-Ga.)). A 
prior version of this Act was introduced in 2009 to the 111th Congress, the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82 (2007) 
(describing arguments for and against the Arbitration Fairness Act). 
 266. In the 2009 version of the Arbitration Fairness Act, the House version was proposed 
before the Pyett decision, and it had explicitly excluded collective bargaining agreements 
from its coverage. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). 
That exclusion was likely due to the fact that before Pyett, it was assumed that union 
employees could not have their right to resolve their statutory discrimination claims in court 
waived based upon Gardner-Denver and its progeny. See Moses, supra note 91, at 825, 84 
n.160. The most recent version of this pending legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2011, precludes mandatory arbitration waivers in collective bargaining agreements in both 
the House and Senate versions. See S. 987, § 4; H.R. 1873, § 4.  
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Amendment to the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, which 
prevents federal contractors with a contract of at least $100,000 from entering into 
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory or tort claims involving sexual 
harassment or assault.267 Further attempts to ban arbitration may soon be addressed 
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,268 
passed by Congress and signed by President Obama in 2010, which authorizes the 
Securities Exchange Commission to ban mandatory arbitration agreements in the 
securities industry involving customers and investor disputes.269 
Accordingly, whether the proponents of arbitration like it or not, there are 
certainly concerns about mandatory arbitration and its fairness that Congress has 
been considering. But there are also concerns about litigation and its fairness, too. 
To the extent a collectively bargained arbitration process provides reasonable 
options to effectively vindicate statutory claims, employees whose unions fairly 
represent all of their interests should be able to use this arbitration process. 
Therefore, if the AFA is ever enacted into law by Congress, any approved language 
in the final terms of the statute that limits enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 
should exclude collective bargaining agreements from its coverage as had initially 
been done before Pyett. Any new statute created by the AFA should make it clear 
that employers cannot unilaterally implement collectively bargained agreements to 
arbitrate under the NLRA. Also, Congress should make it clear that if the employer 
and union choose to waive employees’ rights to pursue statutory discrimination 
claims in court, the agreement must also provide a fair forum to effectively 
vindicate these claims through arbitration. Absent an agreement to effectively 
vindicate statutory rights, employees should still be able to pursue their claims 
through the courts.270 
D. Developing a Cohesive Process to Address Unanswered Questions of Pyett 
Arbitrations 
Union representatives have identified several unanswered questions about 
implementing Pyett waivers as follows: (1) What are the elements of a clear and 
unmistakable waiver?; (2) Does the existence of a clear waiver obligate the union 
to proceed to arbitration?; (3) What risks does the union face when it declines to 
arbitrate or alternatively, when it arbitrates a discrimination grievance?; (4) If the 
union declines to arbitrate, can the employee still proceed in court?; (5) What 
procedural safeguards should parties build into their grievance procedures if they 
intend to handle discrimination claims?; and (6) What level of deference should be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 267. See Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2009). 
 268. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o, 80b-5). 
 269. See Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration, 30 PACE L. REV. 
1174, 1178 (2010). 
 270. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (agreement to 
arbitrate employment discrimination claim is enforceable “[s]o long as the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). 
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given to arbitrators’ decisions?271 Under Professor Gould’s analysis, all claims 
(including statutory claims) fall within the just cause analysis and the employer has 
the burden to establish just cause.272 But employment arbitration does not usually 
employ the just cause standard and tends to follow the same burden of proof in 
court by requiring the employee prove the statutory discrimination occurred.273 
Professor and Labor and Employment Arbitrator Marty Malin has explained the 
nature of the different burdens in labor arbitration versus employment arbitration as 
follows: 
In many grievances that may also implicate the grievant’s statutory 
rights, the CBA is more employee-protective than the statute. For 
example, the typical CBA requires just cause for discipline and 
discharge, provisions that arbitrators have uniformly interpreted place 
on the employer the burden to prove its justification for the adverse 
action, whereas antidiscrimination and other statutes merely prohibit 
basing such adverse action on the employee’s protected status or 
conduct and place the burden on the employee to prove the employer’s 
improper motive. In discipline and discharge grievances with overtones 
of statutory rights’ violations, arbitrators usually may concentrate on 
whether the employer proved just cause, regarding evidence of 
improper motive as impeaching the employer’s purported justification. 
In such cases, the arbitrator need not delve into the minutia of statutory 
law.274  
Accordingly, the issue of resolving a statutory discrimination claim in labor 
arbitration raises a concern about whether the just cause standard should be placed 
on the employer or whether the burden should be placed on the employee to show 
the employer’s illegal motive pursuant to the statute. Without specificity by the 
parties, the arbitrator will have to decide this issue. 
Employer representatives have identified several concerns regarding the drafting 
of Pyett waivers including: (1) making sure the waiver is clear and unmistakable; 
(2) identifying the specific claims that are not subject to being resolved in 
arbitration; (3) not modifying procedures and remedies that would be available in 
the courts; (4) specifying the authority of the arbitrator to decide the statutory 
claim; and a (5) and creating a choice of law provision.275 The Due Process 
Protocol, a collaboration of several constituency groups, developed procedures to 
be followed when an employee must arbitrate a statutory discrimination claims as a 
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condition of employment.276 The Protocol provides some guidance on these issues 
by establishing the following requirements: (1) a jointly selected neutral arbitrator 
who knows the law; (2) sufficient discovery; (3) sharing of costs related to 
arbitrator neutrality; (4) the right to legal representation by a person of the 
employee’s choice; (5) remedies that are equal to those provided under the law; (6) 
a written opinion and award explaining the reasoning; and (7) limited judicial 
review based upon legal requirements.277 The American Arbitration Association 
and JAMS (previously Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services) have agreed to 
abide by the Protocol.278 Subsequent review and suggestions of commentators to 
further revise the Protocol have requested additional procedural protections 
including: (1) a ban on reducing the applicable statute of limitations; (2) fair 
scheduling of the arbitration hearing at times that are better for employees or their 
representation or witnesses to participate; (3) a ban on bringing class actions in 
arbitration; and (4) not making the arbitration process financially prohibitive in 
terms of filing and costs when compared to court fees.279 Certainly, the parties can 
choose to address these matters in their Pyett waiver agreements. However, it is 
more likely the arbitrator will have to resolve these questions and especially if 
neutral service providers do not offer any guidance either.  
CONCLUSION: UNIONS AS LEADING CHANGE AGENTS REGARDING THE HANDLING 
OF WORKPLACE DISPUTES OVER RACE 
This Article has focused on establishing a balance or convergence of interests 
when dealing with the resolution of workplace discrimination claims based on race 
in the union setting. Certainly, employees and unions should learn from the Ricci 
case that they should not get embroiled in divisive pursuits when addressing racial 
discrimination claims that raise conflicts within the ranks of the union membership. 
Given that Pyett makes it clear that a union can waive an employee’s right to 
pursue a statutory employment discrimination claim in court, one question left 
unanswered by Pyett was what should happen when a union decides not to process 
a claim and an employee has no forum to resolve the discrimination claim because 
of the waiver. Accordingly, any waiver should also make clear that the employee 
will be allowed a forum to effectively vindicate the claim even if the union chooses 
not to process it. If that forum is arbitration, it must offer fair procedures, remedies, 
legal representation, and opportunity for fair selection of a diverse arbitrator. 
Employers have already embraced arbitration as a viable tool and the employer in 
Ricci would have definitely benefited from a private and binding resolution of that 
matter. 
When disputes involving race discrimination arise, the union must take a 
proactive approach that focuses on getting all union members enrolled in fairly 
resolving the dispute, regardless of their race. And if there are conflicts, the union 
should not take sides. Instead, the union should support all members involved and 
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affected by the matter by helping them to obtain a fair resolution through either 
arbitration or the courts. The union should negotiate with the employer to provide a 
fair arbitration process that employees can pursue even when the union decides not 
to pursue a grievance in arbitration as allowed within its duty of fair representation.  
As President Obama suggested at the beginning of this Article, unions must help 
their white employees—who believe they have been discriminated against and 
denied privileges and benefits to provide preferences to black employees—to seek 
greater understanding and appreciation regarding the continued existence of racial 
discrimination against black employees. Likewise, the union must also work with 
black employees to appreciate the positions of their fellow white employees who 
are struggling in this difficult economy to get ahead and are angry about the 
economic losses they are incurring. Bridging the gaps to seek mutual interests 
centered on economics and productivity will provide the kind of interest-
convergence via arbitration that will help unions work with all their members and 
their employers in finding a transcendent resolution to workplace discrimination 
claims based on race. 
       
